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The formation of harvest cooperatives has recently generated considerable 
interest among fishermen and regulators as an alternative to other rights-based 
systems such as individual transferable quotas. Many consider the promotion of self-
governance to be essential to more sustainable, equitable and efficient management of 
commercial fisheries. This dissertation examines the incentives created by the 
allocation of collective fishing rights as a mechanism for inducing the creation of 
cooperatives (or sectors). A theoretical model of the fishery characterizes necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the formation of sectors when harvesters have 
incomplete information on how to organize collective fishing but instead must learn 
by doing. The equilibria of the dynamic sector-formation game played by the 
heterogeneous fishermen shows that sectors may fail to form if permit holders are 
unfamiliar with cooperative harvesting. Conversely, when sectors do organize, the 
  
least skilled fishermen join first and the scope of their cooperation, as given by the 
number of tasks they choose to coordinate, increases progressively over time until the 
uncertainty is fully resolved. Profitability, in turn, benefits from enhanced 
cooperation.  
 I test the predictions of the model using a panel data set from the hook gear 
segment in the New England Multispecies Fishery to estimate a stochastic output 
distance function and a technical inefficiency model. The simultaneous estimation of 
both equations allows the full characterization of the underlying multi-output 
technology and the assessment of key determinants of technical efficiency such as 
vessel characteristics, congestion conditions and cooperation.  The results show that 
the least efficient vessels were the first to join the Georges Bank Cod Hook sector in 
2004, and present evidence of earlier cooperation among these vessels (i.e. previous 
to the institutionalization of the group as a sector), hence suggesting familiarity with 
collective harvesting when joining the sector. Additionally, the resulst demonstrate 
that technical efficiency was higher for sector vessels than common pool boats during 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Policy Background 
 
 
The formation of harvest cooperatives and similar efficiency enhancing 
institutional changes have recently generated considerable interest among fishermen and 
regulators as an alternative to other individual rights-based systems such as individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs). Many consider the promotion of self-governance by 
increasing the scope of decisions assumed by the industry to be essential to achieving 
more sustainable, equitable and efficient management. Fishermen have incentives to 
increase the rents they extract from the resource, and the objective of self-governance is 
precisely to empower them to operationalize these incentives. 
An illustration at hand is the recent expansion of sector-based management in the 
United States New England Multispecies Fishery and its likely adoption in other fisheries 
in the country. Following the success of initiatives like the Pacific Whiting Conservation 
Cooperative and the Alaskan Pollock Conservation Cooperative on the West Coast of the 
United States, the regulator (New England Fishery Management Council) has 
implemented Amendment 16 and approved nineteen industry groups in the multispecies 
fishery to opt out of the current effort control system of management in order to form 
harvesting cooperatives called sectors.1 Sectors are groups of self-selecting permit 
holders who receive an annual allocation of each of the groundfish species they catch in 
                                                 
1 A sector must comprise at least three permit holders. At this time, only the groundfish industry is 
authorized by regulation to create sectors; however, in a recent amendment to the scallop fishery 
management plan (Amendment 11), the New England Fishery Management Council agreed to allow the 
General Category fishery to form sectors. There are portions of the limited access fleet that are interested as 
well. Furthermore, harvesters in the herring fishery have shown interest in forming sectors (Scoping 
document for Amendment 4 to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan, Amendment 4 Scoping 




return for designing and implementing their own harvesting and enforcement rules to 
keep their total catch within the limits of their allocation. Each sector is also responsible 
for developing and implementing a system of monitoring and reporting measures that 
accounts for all catch. Amendment 16, which took effect on May of 2010, significantly 
expanded the role of sector allocations as a management tool. The amendment eliminates 
the 20% cap on the share of the total allowable catch (TAC) that a sector can hold, and 
allows intra-seasonal transfers of quota among sectors (Final Amendment 16, October 16, 
2009).  
Successful case studies of self-governance in fisheries have been extensively 
documented (see, for example, Townsend et al. 2008, Uchida 2007, Knapp 2007, Silva 
and Kitts 2006, Leal 2005, Asada et al. 1983) and the efficiency gains associated with 
cooperative harvesting are well established (Costello at al. 2009, Costello and Deacon 
2006, Uchida and Wilen 2005, Gaspart and Seki 2003, Stollery 1998). Nevertheless, self-
governance has emerged in relatively few of the world’s fisheries.2 Research on the 
obstacles to the adoption of self-regulation has traditionally focused on the number and 
heterogeneity of harvesters and the difficulties of enforcement (see, for example, 
Erdlenbruch et al. 2008, Burton 2003, Scott 1993, Ostrom 1990, and Johnson and 
Libecap 1982). Yet it is doubtful that these obstacles exhaust all the conditions under 
which fishermen’s attempts to self-organize break down. Furthermore, the understanding 
of these obstacles to self-governance sheds little light on the actual functioning of fishing 
cooperatives once they have succeeded in forming. The question is whether there is a 
                                                 
2  The comprehensive volume on self-governance in fisheries published in 2008 by FAO and edited by 




different rationale for the common failure of fishermen to self-organize, which can also 
provide insight into the likely path of cooperation once the harvesting group has formed.  
This dissertation examines how incomplete information on the optimal 
implementation of collective harvesting affects the incentives to undertake cooperation. 
Hence, the analysis understands “self-governance as a learned behavior” (Townsend et al. 
2008, p.17) and assumes that the transition from independent, competitive fishing to 
collective harvesting can present a challenge to fishermen accustomed to the ‘race for 
fish’ under input controls or total allowable catch limits. This is an aspect of cooperation 
in the commons that has been overlooked by the existing literature.  
In Chapter 2, I develop a theoretical model of the fishery and characterize 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the formation of sectors when harvesters have 
incomplete information on how to organize collective fishing but learn-by-doing. The 
equilibria of the dynamic sector-formation game played by the heterogeneous fishermen 
shows that least skilled fishermen have incentives to join sectors first, and that sectors 
may fail to form if permit holders are unfamiliar with cooperative harvesting. Conversely, 
when sectors do organize, the scope of their cooperation, as given by the number of tasks 
they choose to coordinate, increases progressively over time until the uncertainty is fully 
resolved. Profitability and sector membership benefit from enhanced cooperation.  
 In the empirical section of the dissertation I test some of the conclusions of the 
theoretical model using panel data obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service 
on the New England Multispecies Fishery. The data is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 
presents the empirical framework, namely the simultaneous estimation, for the hook gear 




estimation of this system of equations allows me to fully characterize the underlying 
multi-output technology and to study the impact of vessel characteristics and fleet 
conditions (i.e. such as crowding of fishing grounds and cooperative interactions) on 
vessels’ technical efficiencies. Thus, unlike most empirical studies of commercial 
fisheries’ production frontiers, which implicitly assume input-output separability and 
estimate a weighted aggregate measure of output as a function of inputs, this dissertation 
uses a multi-output approach, allowing for the testing of the separability assumption and 
the derivation of the ability of fishermen to alter their output mix. Second, the analysis is 
applied to panel data and, unlike short-term studies, explicitly incorporates the variability 
of stocks biomasses over time into the estimation. Third, the study explicitly accounts for 
the effect of fishermen’s interactions on efficiency in order to identify cooperation among 
harvesters. 
Results of the econometric analyses are presented in Chapter 5. They show that 
the least efficient vessels were indeed the first to join the Georges Bank Cod Hook sector 
in 2004 and present evidence of earlier cooperation among these vessels (i.e. previous to 
the institutionalization of the group as a sector), hence suggesting familiarity with 
collective harvesting when joining the sector. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that 
technical efficiency was higher for sector vessels than common pool boats during the 






1.1 Policy Background 
1.1.1 Federal Regulation of US Fisheries 
In 1976, the U.S. Congress passed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act, the main law governing marine fisheries management in federal 
waters, to protect both the American fishing industry as well as a number of species of 
fish found off the U.S. coast. The Act, reauthorized as the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) 
in 1996, officially gave the federal government the authority to manage fisheries and 
claimed the area between 3 and 200 miles from shore, an area known today as the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Act created eight Regional Fishery Management 
Councils: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, 
Pacific, North Pacific, and Western Pacific.  Each Council’s area of responsibility is the 
EEZ adjacent to its constituent states. Councils develop and recommend fishery 
management plans and amendments for fisheries within their area of responsibility. 
NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) approves and implements these 
plans and measures.  
The New England Region includes the states of Maine, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Federal fisheries in this region are 
managed by the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC). The management 
authority of the NEFMC extends to the Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank, and southern New 
England, and overlaps with the Mid-Atlantic Council for some species in that region. 
Voting members include the coastal state directors responsible for marine fisheries, the 
NMFS Regional Administrator, and citizens nominated by the coastal state governors and 




representative each from the US Department of State, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, 
the US Coast Guard, and the Atlantic States Interstate Marine Fisheries Commission. 
Presently, the Council has nine fishery management plans (FMPs) in effect: Northeast 
Multispecies (Groundfish), Scallop, Monkfish, Herring, Small Mesh Multispecies 
(whiting and two stocks of hake), Red Crab, and a plan for the Northeast Skate Complex, 
as well as two additional plans that are prepared jointly with the Mid-Atlantic Council, 
Monkfish and Spiny Dogfish. 
 
1.1.2 Rebuilding Targets and Catch Shares 
The Magnuson Act has been amended in several occasions over the years. Two 
major recent sets of amendments to the law are the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 and 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 
2006. The Fisheries Act of 1996 focused on rebuilding overfished fisheries, protecting 
essential fish habitat, and reducing bycatch. Concretely, it mandated the end of 
overfishing and the rebuilding within 10 years of depleted populations to levels able to 
support the maximum amount of fish that can be sustainably caught, if biologically 
possible. The Reauthorization Act of 2006 mandated the use of annual catch limits and 
accountability measures to end overfishing, provided for widespread market-based 
fishery management through limited access privilege programs, and called for increased 
international cooperation. 
Despite the mandate of the Sustainable Fisheries Act, the rebuilding targets for 
many depleted stocks have yet to be met. According to the “2009 Status of US Fisheries” 




overfishing (and 319 stocks are unknown with respect to their overfished status, and 272 
are unknown with respect to their overfishing status). Of these, 17 overfished stocks and 
8 populations currently subject to overfishing are in the Northeast region.  
By 2006, when the Reauthorization Act was passed, the challenges facing US 
fishery managers made clear that additional tools to improve management effectiveness 
needed to be considered.  The 2006 amendment to the MSA recognized catch shares as 
one of such tools. Catch share is a general term used to describe several fishery 
management strategies that allocate a specific portion of the total allowable fishery catch 
(TAC) to individuals, cooperatives, communities or other entities. Each recipient of a 
catch share is directly accountable to stop fishing when his specific quota is reached. The 
term includes specific programs such as Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) programs, Sector 
Quota programs, and Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs) that grant an exclusive 
privilege to harvest in a geographically designated fishing ground. Catch shares programs 
have been in use in the US since 1990 and now include 13 different fisheries from Alaska 
to Florida, which are managed by six different Councils. In order to expand the use of 
these programs, NOAA released a draft policy on the use of catch share programs in 
fishery management plans in December 2009. The draft NOAA policy encourages the 
use of catch share programs to help rebuild fisheries and sustain fishermen, communities 
and working waterfronts. The fishery-wide implementation of sector-based management 
in the Northeast Multispecies Fishery during year 2010 is a reflection of NMFS’s 







1.1.3 The New England Multispecies Fishery 
 
 
The New England groundfish fishery exploits demersal marine resources off the 
east coast of the U.S. from Maine to Connecticut. The fixed gear fleet uses gillnets, 
longlines and handlines, while the mobile gear fleet utilizes otter trawls. Many of the 
most productive stocks in this fishery have collapsed due to an ever-improving harvesting 
technology and failure of the management system to take the necessary steps to rebuild 
the populations. As a result, landings have fallen and fish prices increased, fueled by 
meager catches and increasing demand by health-conscious consumers.3 Groundfish 
landings reached 34 million metric tons in 2008, with total revenues of over US$65 
million.  
Groundfish stock management under the Magnuson-Stevens Act began with the 
adoption of a plan for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder in 1977. This plan, which 
relied on hard quotas (total allowable catches, or TACs), proved unworkable due to the 
inability of the regulator to enforce the TACs. The quota system was rejected in 1982 
with the adoption of the Interim Groundfish Plan, which relied on minimum fish sizes 
and mesh regulations for the Gulf of Maine (GOM) and Georges Bank (GB) to control 
fishing mortality. The interim plan was replaced by the Northeast Multispecies Fishery 
Management Plan (FMP) in 1986, which established biological targets in terms of 
maximum spawning potential yet continued to rely on gear restrictions and minimum 
mesh size to control fishing mortality. Amendment 5 was a major revision to the FMP. 
Adopted in 1994, it implemented reductions in time fished (days-at-sea, or DAS) for 
                                                 





some fleet segments and adopted year-round closures to control mortality. Amendment 7, 
adopted in 1996, expanded the DAS program and accelerated the reduction in DAS first 
adopted in Amendment 5, but failed to convey sufficient reduction in fishing mortality 
due to the large amount of latent effort that existed in the fishery. Vessel buybacks in 
1996 and 1997, with $25 million in government funds targeted at active groundfish 
vessels, purchased 79 vessels and permits that had accounted for roughly 20% of the 
revenues in the fishery. Despite this, the number of active groundfish vessels remained 
relatively constant between 1996 and 2001, implying that previously inactive vessels had 
entered the fishery following the buybacks. In 2001 another federally funded buyback 
purchased 245 permits for $9.6 million. In spite of these reductions in active capacity, 
latent effort, increasingly strict limits on effort, and other safeguards such as year-round 
and seasonal closed areas and trip limits, fishing mortality on some key groundfish stocks 
continued to exceed overfishing thresholds and evidence of substantial latent effort 
remained.  
The next major change to the FMP came with the Settlement Agreement of 
August 2002. The Settlement Agreement was the result of a lawsuit brought against 
NMFS by environmental groups for violating the federal Sustainable Fisheries Act of 
1996 by allowing the continued overfishing of cod, haddock, yellowtail flounder and 
other groundfish off the coast of New England. The provisions in the Settlement 
Agreement included a freeze on DAS based on the highest annual level used from fishing 
years 1996-2000, reduced by 20%, a freeze on the issuance of new permits, increased 
gear restrictions for certain gear types, including gillnets, hook-gear and trawl nets, 




Amendment 13, which was developed over a four-year period and became 
effective on May 1, 2004, adopted a broad set of management measures to achieve the 
fishing mortality targets necessary to rebuild overfished stocks and meet other 
requirements of the Magnusson-Stevens Act. Among the most relevant changes were to 
reduce DAS available to fishermen, cut trip possession limits for the majority of the 
species, and proscribe the reactivation of latent permits. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of 
the average DAS per vessel for the period 1996-2007. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Average DAS per vessel, period 1996-2007 
 
 
Amendment 13 also contained provisions that allowed groups of fishermen to 
voluntarily form coop-type organizations called “sectors”. A sector could apply for an 
allocation of catch of one or several regulated groundfish species. The allocation of each 
species would be based on the documented accumulated landings of sector members for 














group would then receive an annual allocation equal to the target TAC for that species 
multiplied by the ratio of the group’s catch to the total commercial catch. If a sector 
requested an allocation for all regulated stocks, and submitted a operations plan that 
would limit their catches to that allocation, they could avoid input-control regulations 
such as DAS limits, trip limits and seasonal area closures. Permit holders that did not 
wish to join a sector could continue to fish under the common set of regulations. The 
sector regulations in the amendment specified that no sector could be allocated more than 
20% percent of the TAC unless otherwise authorized by the Council. The Georges Bank 
Cod Hook sector, the first sector to start operations, was authorized and implemented 
with Amendment 13.  
Since the adoption of the Amendment 13, four adjustments actions (Frameworks 
40A, 40B, 41, and 42) of the Multispecies Fishery Management Plan have been 
implemented. Among the measures adopted by these actions were the creation of a 
Georges Bank yellowtail flounder rebuilding strategy, changes in trip limits, extension of 
the DAS leasing program and modifications of the DAS transfer program, changes in 
gear standards, and the establishment of the Georges Bank Fixed Gear sector (approved 
in November of 2006), the second sector to start operations.4 
Amendment 16, implemented in May of 2010, is the latest major modification to 
the Multispecies Management Plan. It adopts a broad range of measures designed to 
achieve reduced mortality targets, provide opportunities to target healthy stocks, and 
improve the administration of the fishery. Among other measures, the amendment 
significantly expanded the role of sectors. It removed the 20% cap on an individual 
                                                 
4 A third sector, the summer flounder sector, was approved in 2009 by the Rhode Island Department of 




sector’s total quota and approved seventeen new sectors. Under Amendment 16, sectors 
receive exemptions from many of the common pool effort control measures in exchange 
for a sector TAC for each species in the management plan (the so-called Annual Catch 
Entitlements, ACE). Furthermore, sectors can conduct the fishing activity according to 
their own business plans. In order to assure that sector ACEs are not exceeded, 
Amendment 16 adopts a new system of at-sea and dockside catch monitoring. Sectors can 
carry up to 10 percent of unused quota forward into the next fishing year, and sectors are 
allowed to exchange ACE with other sectors. 
 
 
1.1.4 The Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector 
 
The Georges Bank Cod Hook sector is comprised of a small, day-boat hook-and-
line (benthic longlines and rod-and-reel) fleet. Sector vessels operate primarily out of 
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, fishing in the Georges Bank and to a lesser extent the Gulf of 
Maine, with the majority of the landings by sector vessels occurring in Chatham and 
Harwichport. Most sector vessels range from 25 to 70 feet in length. The GB Cod Hook 
Sector, the first sector authorized under Amendment 13, began operations in July 2004. 
Sector vessels received an allocation of Georges Bank cod only but not for the other 
species they harvested. They remained subject to DAS controls but became exempt from 
trip limits and restrictions on transfer of DAS within the sector. The sector was 
reauthorized yearly in the period 2005-2008 and continued to operate in a fashion similar 
to that of its first season. The sector’s cod quota is allocated for each month of the fishing 




Once the aggregate monthly quota is reached, no sector vessel is authorized to use fishing 
gear capable of catching cod. In practice, however, catch has never reached the monthly 
quota, and the annual catch of the sector has remained well below the sector’s TAC, 
largely due to low catch rates for cod and continued restrictions of DAS. The number of 
permits, GB cod allocations, and GB cod landings are shown in Table 1. 1. 
 
 
Table 1.1: No. permits, cod allocation and landings for the GB Cod Hook Sector 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total number of members 58 52 49 35 19 
Entry  3 3 0 0 7 
Exit 9 6 14 16 2 
Active members 47 36 27 18 12 
Entry 1 2 1 2 n.a. 
Exit 12 11 10 8 n.a. 
Allocation (mt) 371 455 615 675 658 
% GB cod TAC 12.60% 11.70% 10.03% 8.02% 6.44% 
Reported landings (mt) 130 125 89 86 97 
% of quota landed 35.0% 27.5% 14.5% 12.7% 14.7% 
Note: entry to and exit from the sector occur at the end of each year.  A total of sixty one permit holders became 
members during 2004-2008. 
 
Since its formation this sector has seen a steady decline in the number of permits. 
This trend closely resembles the overall reduction in active permits in the groundfish 
fishery, where the number of vessels has halved in little more than a decade as a 
consequence of the steady tightening of input controls (see figure 1.1 above). Indeed, the 
fact that sector vessels remained subject to the same system of strict DAS restrictions and 
trip possession limits (with the exemption of cod) as the common pool, coupled with the 
growing scarcity of GB cod, limited the ability of members to benefit from the collective 




dispositions of Amendment 13.5 This is probably why these fishermen have chosen, 
under the provisions of the recently approved Amendment 16, to opt out of the input-
control system by requesting quota allocations for each one of the species they harvest.  
                                                 




Chapter 2: Theoretical Model 
 
This chapter examines how incomplete information on the optimal 
implementation of collective fishing affects the incentives to undertake cooperation. 
Hence, the analysis understands “self-governance as a learned behavior” (Townsend et al. 
2008, p.17) and assumes that the transition from independent, competitive fishing to 
collective harvesting can present a challenge to fishermen accustomed to the ‘race for 
fish’ under input controls or total allowable catch limits. 
I develop a model of learning-by-doing, in which the choice of the number of 
tasks to coordinate each season critically depends on fishermen’s current information. I 
then study the equilibria of the sector-formation game played by the heterogeneous 
fishermen, to answer the following questions concerning fishing cooperatives: Under 
what conditions are sectors expected to form? Who will join? What types of harvesting 
schemes will emerge? 
The model predicts that a lack of familiarity of fishermen with cooperative 
harvesting may entirely preclude sectors from forming. On the other hand, if sectors do 
organize, the least skilled permit holders in the fishery join first and the scope of their 
cooperation (i.e. the number of coordinated tasks) is expected to increase gradually over 
time. These results are consistent with a variety of stylized facts about fishing coops. 
They help explain why quota holders rarely pool their shares of the TAC and fish 
cooperatively despite the potential efficiency gains. Furthermore, the rationale offered in 




fishing– is essentially different from the familiar free-riding in teams, or from adverse 
selection arguments that rely on asymmetric information on permit holders’ skills. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the 
relevant literature on coalitions and coordination in fisheries. Section 2.3 develops the 
model and solves the sector-formation game. Section 2.4 discusses some of the 
assumptions and outlines future extensions of the framework. Section 2.5 presents policy 
implications of the findings and offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.1 Previous Literature 
Cooperation in fisheries has been extensively studied. Most of the models on 
coalition formation, however, have been applied to the study of the stability of 
cooperative agreements in high seas fisheries (see, for example, Kaitala and Lindroos 
2001, Pintassilgo 2000, and Duarte et. al.  2000).This line of research typically assumes 
that the gains from cooperation arise exclusively from effort regulation, and that players 
are either homogeneous, or heterogeneous but very limited in number. In this section I 
discuss papers on agreements that form fishing cooperatives.  
Knapp (2007) presents a detailed account of the functioning of the Chignik Salmon 
Cooperative during 2002-2005. He describes how the coop came about, how it was 
organized and governed, some of its effects, and why it ended.6 Knapp explains, for 
example, how the Chignik coop was able to reduce operating costs (such as insurance, 
maintenance, fuel, and crew costs) by drastically consolidating the fleet. In 2004, out of 
                                                 
6 In March 2005, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the authorization for the Chignik cooperative, holding 
that the coop regulation was fundamentally at odds with the Limited Entry Act (i.e. it allowed people who 




87 members, only 19 boats fished for the coop. The coop gradually undertook other 
initiatives to further decrease costs. It placed fixed leads on either side of the Chignik 
River where it enters the Chignik Lagoon, the area where the coop carried out its harvest, 
in order to reduce fishing costs by channeling returning salmon towards a narrow opening 
between the leads. The coop often timed its harvesting to coincide with low tides, when 
the Chignik Lagoon shrinks to a fraction of its size at high water, in order to concentrate 
the fish to a greater extent than would occur naturally. Finally, the coop coordinated 
information on stock locations from its active members and used this information to 
dispatch vessels to the most productive sites.    
Knapp also recounts how the Chignik coop developed new ways for delivering and 
holding live fish to improve the quality of the product. Coop members traveled to British 
Columbia in 2003 to gather information from the farmed salmon industry on their 
handling techniques and quality control measures in the transportation of live salmon, 
and continued to experiment with different methods of handling fish in the next few 
years. By the third season, and as a result of these efforts, they were able to negotiate a 
contract with the processor which incorporated specific price premiums in return for 
quality. 
Knapp makes specific reference to how the coop fishermen had to learn an 
entirely new way of fishing –cooperating instead of competing–, and explicitly includes 
among the lessons from the Chignik case that “fisheries self-governance selects for a 
different set of skills [from competitive fishing]” (Knapp 2007, p.44). In the report, he 
quotes the coop’s fleet manager to stress this point: “…there were some socialization 




fascinated by how the Chignik guys really did not know how to ‘team’ fish…A few 
fathers and sons, and maybe some brothers, shared information on the radio, but 
essentially no one else had a formal group that shared strategy and information” (ibid, 
p.16).  
Costello et al. (2009) use a two-stage game to analyze the formation of the 
Chignik cooperative and explain some of the outcomes described by Knapp (2007). They 
model the benefits derived from coop membership as given by the availability of a public 
good input that reduces cost per unit of effort. The authors characterize the subgame 
perfect equilibrium and show that it is consistent with the consolidation of the coop fleet, 
the extension of the fishing season length, and the fact that fishermen that remained 
independent had better fishing skills than coop members (as indicated by higher historical 
catch rates).  
Costello and Deacon (2006) study the benefits of sharing information on the 
location of stocks for ITQ holders, and conclude that this type of cooperation could 
eliminate inefficiencies associated with redundant search by independent fishermen. In a 
similar vein, Lynham (2006) suggests that information sharing on productive fishing 
grounds may prevent information cascades and herding behavior. Recently, Evans and 
Weninger (2009) have suggested that an information sharing cooperative would be 
beneficial for its members, but faces a free-riding problem as each member prefers that 
others undertake the costly search for information. 
Uchida (2007) studies Japan’s co-management groups, called Fishery 
Management Organizations (FMO), to find that simply allocating the allowable harvest to 




management measures are needed. He identifies two essential measures for successful co-
management, effort coordination and adoption of a pooling arrangement. With these two 
measures, FMOs are able to operate in quasi-corporate style (i.e. operations are 
determined centrally and members are paid in a form that is similar to a dividend). 
Particularly interesting is his account of the Walleye Pollack (Suketoudara) fishery 
management, in the Hiyama region of Hokkaido. Uchida not only describes the 
sophisticated fishing arrangements adopted by some fishermen in this fishery (i.e. 
voluntary seasonal closures, establishment of no-fishing areas, imposition of gear 
restrictions, three-layered fishing-ground rotation: groups, teams, and individuals, etc.) 
but also how these self-imposed regulations have evolved. For example, while in the 
early 1980s the season opened in early December and continued until late March, in 
recent years the fishery has opened in early November and closed in early February. The 
reason for this self-imposed seasonal restriction is twofold: to maximize the value of the 
product (roe, the most valuable product, peaks in quality in this period), and to enhance 
successful reproduction of the stock (as the survival of the fertilized eggs is enhanced 
when water temperature drops below 10° C, which typically occurs in early February). 
Similarly, Uchida describes how harvesters in the Nishi section have recently modified 
their rotation scheme –intended to avoid congestion and the consequent costs, such as 
gear damage– to eliminate the inefficiency associated with the fact that some vessels had 
to travel long distances to reach their assigned fishing areas. This inefficiency has 
become acute and apparent as fuel prices have soared. 
Uchida and Wilen (2005) develop a simple model to show that revenue pooling 




members to benefit from better terms of trade. The reason for this result is that forcing 
individuals to pool and share their proceeds generates incentives to shirk and restricts 
landings. This reduction in decentralized and non-cooperative effort choices leads to a 
reduction in aggregate harvest and higher prices. The extent to which market gains are 
exploited depends on both the pooling ratio and the elasticity of demand.  
Finally, Platteau and Seki (2001) and Gaspart and Seki (2003) study three distinct 
groups of fishermen that operate in the shiroebi (Japanese glass shrimp) fishery. In both 
papers, the authors show that only the two groups comprised of homogeneous harvesters 
(as given by individual catch performances) have adopted some type of pooling 
arrangement and coordinate effort. Of these, only the group that has being operating the 
longest pools 100% of its profits and has implemented a scheme of community fishing. 
They synchronize fishing hours and number of hauls, share the burden of net repair, 
systematically exchange information on stock location, collectively control access to 
fishing grounds, and diffuse knowledge and expertise about fishing techniques. 
As the aforementioned papers make patent, once fishermen join harvesting 
cooperatives –and it remains an unresolved puzzle why so few do– they face strong 
incentives to actively engage in cooperation to both reduce cost of effort and increase the 
value of their catch.  Cooperation can boost profitability and is typically achieved through 
the design of fishing rules that attempt to synchronize the activities of coop members. 
Moreover, these fishing rules do not remain unchanged but evolve through time, allowing 
groups to progressively broaden the scope of their cooperation.  
The accumulation of experience in team fishing as permit holders work together 




schemes. Yet despite the empirical evidence provided by these case studies, none of the 
theoretical models in the articles specifically address the possibility that fishermen must 
learn to implement collective fishing. The model in the next section explicitly accounts 
for this possibility, providing a previously unexplored explanation for both the common 
failure of fishing coops to emerge, and for the gradual increase in the scope of fishermen 
coordination when cooperatives succeed to form. 
 
2.2 The Model7 
2.2.1 The Fishery  
A limited entry commercial fishery (i.e. the number of harvesters who may 
participate is limited by statute or regulation) is comprised of N risk-neutral individual 
fishermen. Fishermen are assumed heterogeneous with respect to skill. Differential 
abilities may be attributed to acquired knowledge and innate skills. The catch of 
individual fisherman i in season t, , depends on the current fish biomass , his 
catching skill , and the amount of time he spends fishing (i.e. days at sea) .  
 
2.1                                                            , ,  
 
The cost of effort (i.e. cost per day at sea), denoted by ci, varies among fishermen 
because of differences in their fishing abilities.8 Without any loss of generality, I index 
harvesters in increasing order of their fishing skills so that N denotes the most skilled 
                                                 
7 The appendix presents a summary of the main variables in the model. 




permit holder in the entire fishery (i.e.  ). I assume that the ratio ⁄  is 
decreasing in i ( i.e. / / ,  for all i).The ratio ⁄  can be thought of as an 
(inverse) efficiency parameter; the lower the unit cost of effort, or the higher the skill 
level, the lower the value of ⁄ .  
In the first season a new regulation is passed, authorizing fishermen to organize in 
a sector and allowing them to design their own governing rules. Under this new rule, each 
member is allocated a potential sector contribution (PSC) based on his landings history. 
If the catch function in (2.1) is specified as , , , where  is an 
increasing function, it is possible to write vessel i’s PSC as proportional to his skill level:9 
 
2.2                                                         PSC TAC  
 
where ∑ , the summation of skill over all permit holders in the fishery, and TAC  
denotes the total allowable catch set by the regulator for season t. The combined PSCs 
from all sector members is then used to determine the sector's annual catch entitlement, 
meaning its quota, in the following way: 
 




If fishermen, on the other hand, decide to continue fishing independently as part of the 
common pool, they add their PSCs to the common pool’s total quota but have to compete 
                                                 
9 The curvature properties of  will depend on the behavioral characteristics of the fish stock (i.e. sedentary 




for their share of the catch. The total quota allocated to the common pool is calculated 
simply as TAC , where  is given by (2.3) above. The fish stock each season 
is determined by its level in the previous period, its biological growth function, and the 
previous TAC. I assume there is no depletion within the season. 
Once the sector is formed, its members need to agree on the particular fishing 
arrangement to adopt. This decision has to be revised each season, and the details of the 
fishing scheme specified in a sector’s operations plan, which is submitted annually for the 
approval of the regulator. One possibility is for the sector to simply opt for independent 
fishing where each member catches his own quota. In an overcapitalized fishery, sector 
members may instead decide to pool their quota and rationalize the fleet in order to catch 
their share of the TAC at a lower cost employing their most skilled fishermen. In this 
latter scenario, the sector will further need to decide whether to allow fishermen in the 
consolidated fleet to operate independently of each other, or to alternatively engage them 
in active cooperation. The sector may decide, for example, to encourage them to share 
information on stock locations to avoid redundant search effort, coordinate their access to 
productive fishing spots, implement collective search for lost gear, etc. Under complete 
coordination, the sector effectively adopts a sole-owner approach, in which the operations 
are completely managed to maximize sector profits. 
I characterize the specific fishing scheme adopted by the group by the number of 
tasks ω that must be coordinated in order to implement it. Examples of tasks to 
coordinate are the search for the stock, the access to the fishing grounds, and the 




trivially equal to zero. The sector will be assumed to be a single-minded entity 
administered by a sector manager. 
Figure 1 below summarizes the sequence of events each season: first, fishermen 
decide whether to join the sector or remain independent as part of the common pool; in 
phase 2 the sector selects its fishing scheme; finally, fishermen in the common pool exert 
fishing effort, and the sector implements its fishing arrangement and assigns fishing times 










In what follows I suppose that fishermen select their strategies each season by 
myopic optimization. This means that permit holders care only about short-term (current) 
payoffs and ignore the impact of their actions on the evolution of the fishery. While this 
assumption may seem extreme, less plausible is the alternative of perfect farsightedness 
in which all economic decisions made by individual fishermen are globally optimal over 
an infinite horizon. As will be discussed later in the chapter, while this assumption 
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reason for this is the requirement (an integral part of the new regulation itself) that 
fishermen ratify their decisions on an annual basis. This periodic opportunity to revise 
their decisions on sector membership and sector’s fishing rules effectively makes permit 
holders’ choices reversible.  
 
2.2.2 The Sector: Internal Governance and Coordination of Tasks 
In this section I introduce a stylized fishing sector that is fully characterized by i) 
simple contracts to distribute profits among members, and by ii) the degree of fishing 
cooperation its members decide to implement each season. 
 
2.2.2.1. Distributing Profits 
The payoff for a particular member of the sector will depend on how profits are 
distributed within the group. In the model the sharing rule ( ) is exogenously determined 
and thus taken as given. I assume that all profits are distributed as dividends each season 
and that each member receives a fixed share of total profits , which may or may not 
depend on individual skills. I will be interested here in discussing two alternative profit-
sharing rules that are simple to implement and have been used before by fishing 
cooperatives:10  
(i) equal sharing among members 1/N , where N  denotes the sector’s size 
in season t), and 
                                                 
10  Equal sharing of profits is used, for example, by some groups in the shiroebi (Japanese glass shrimp) 
fishery (Gaspart and Seki, 2003), and was the formula adopted by the Chignik Salmon Cooperative in 
Alaska while it was in operation in 2002-2005 (Knapp 2007). Pooling arrangements in which the 
distribution rule incorporates the heterogeneity of both vessel and crew sizes are used by some groups in 
the Suketoudara (Walleye Pollack) fishery in the Hiyama region of Hokkaido, Japan (Uchida and 




(ii) profit sharing proportional to potential sector contribution (PSC) (i.e. 
/ ∑ ).  
While pooling arrangements of this type help to align the individual’s incentive to 
maximize his return with the group’s incentive, they may also encourage members to 
shirk. Since I am interested here in studying the effects of incomplete information on 
sector’s formation and growth, in the rest of the chapter I disregard the enforcement 
problem and assume that members abide by the rules and norms accorded by the group. 
The penalties for violations stipulated in Amendment 16 are quite stringent and likely to 
deter, to some extent, shirking and cheating within sectors. Thus, for example, “…if a 
vessel is expelled from a sector, it cannot participate in the groundfish fishery for the 
remaining of the fishing year”, (Final Amendment 16, October 16, p. 107), and “Sectors 
may be held jointly liable for violations of the following sector operations plan 
requirements: annual catch entitlement overages, discarding of legal-sized fish, and 
misreporting of catch (landings or discards)”, (ibid, p. 107). 
 
2.2.2.2. Implementing Cooperation 
The transition from competitive and independent fishing to collective fishing is 
viewed here as the adoption of a new fishing technique. I characterize each cooperative 
fishing technique by the number of tasks ω that fishermen need to coordinate to 
implement it.11 The larger the number of tasks ω to coordinate, the more cooperative the 
fishing scheme. Thus, for example, a quasi-corporate operation like the one run by the 
Chignik cooperative or by some Japanese groups (i.e. large ω), is deemed more 
                                                 
11 The number of tasks can be interpreted as the degree of division of labor that describes the fishing 




cooperative than one where there is only coordination of access to fishing grounds to 
avoid congestion externalities (i.e. ω 1).  
 In the model, the benefits from cooperation come from the reduction in the unit 
cost of effort for sector members. Cooperation among fishermen, however, provides 
opportunities not only to coordinate fishing and reduce costs, but also to tailor product 
timing and mix to suit market conditions, to increase product quality and recovery rates, 
and to improve fishing safety. In the current model the learning-by-doing by the group 
determines the transition function regulating the evolution of the sector’s profitability. 
That profitability is increased via cost reductions instead of product quality 
improvements is not critical for the results. I have opted to use the reduction in cost of 
effort as the modeling device for the benefits of cooperation, because it is in the design of 
new fishing schemes that Amendment 16 offers more opportunities (and challenges) to 
prospective sectors. The reduction in the cost of harvest will undoubtedly be a key 
determinant of the schemes that finally emerge. Furthermore, some harvest cooperatives 
have accomplished remarkable achievements in cost savings. For example, the cost 
savings as percentage of ex-vessel value attributable to the Chignik cooperative have 
been estimated to lie in the range 46%-61% (Knapp 2007). 
Sectors will be able to design their own fishing rules without restrictions on the 
harvesting techniques they can adopt. Complex harvest strategies over space and time are 
available to sector members to maximize product value and to reduce harvesting costs. 
The present chapter explores an aspect of collective action unaddressed by previous 
research, by assuming that the transition to team fishing may be challenging if permit 




cooperatively. This is, for example, the case of the New England groundfish fishery, 
which has been managed through input controls (such as limits on days at sea and trip 
possession) since the early eighties. It is precisely the overcapitalization of the fishery 
and the concomitant inefficiency that sector-based management is supposed to address. 
Concretely, I assume that upon adoption, sector members have incomplete information 
on how to coordinate the ω tasks that they have decided to implement. However, their 
knowledge increases as they experiment repeatedly with the new technique and gain 
familiarity with it. Pair trawling is a simple illustration of how demanding the transition 
to team fishing can be. This technique uses two vessels, each towing one warp, and keeps 
the net mouth open by the outward pull provided by correct lateral spacing of the boats, 
so that no otter boards are needed. While pair-trawling may be more efficient than single 
boat trawling (as it permits greater control of the net itself, and because engine noise from 
the boats is not directly over the fish and thus it does not scare them from the path of the 
net), the need of cooperation and finely-tuned coordination between the skippers, which 
becomes particularly challenging under adverse weather conditions, limits its use in 
commercial fisheries (Gabriel et al. 2005). Hazlehurst (1994) reports cases, in the island 
of Vind, Sweden, of costly coordination mistakes even among pair-trawling teams that 
had been working together for almost 20 years. When discussing fishermen’ means of 
learning and knowing, he quotes the harvesters themselves as stating that “fishermen 
learn by doing” (ibid, p.16).  
I draw on the work of Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), and earlier research by 
Wilson (1975) and Prescott (1972), to model uncertainty about each new fishing scheme 




new harvesting technique can be viewed as a problem in which the sector must choose 
not only the amount on inputs to hire, but also how to use those inputs. The choice of 
how to use the inputs can be understood as a dial-setting problem. The sector manager 
chooses inputs and a dial setting. The best dial-setting is unknown to the sector. The 
sector manager makes its best guess at the setting, observes the outcome, updates its 
beliefs about the optimal setting, and proceeds to the next fishing season.  
Consider a sector faced with the decision of how to collectively harvest its 
allocation. The set of feasible collective fishing arrangements is given by Ω, where Ω is 
assumed to be finite subset of R++.
12 Each ω Ω defines a cooperative fishing scheme, 
namely, the scheme requiring the coordination of ω tasks among sector members. Thus, a 
higher ω indexes a higher number of tasks. Without loss of generality, I assume that the 
minimum number of tasks to coordinate is one (i.e. min ω| ω Ω 1). Thus, the 
coordination of a single task defines the simplest of the cooperative schemes in Ω. To 
avoid notational complexity that does not add to the analysis, I leave it implicit how the 
specific tasks to coordinate in each scheme are chosen. Note that 0 Ω , that is, 
independent fishing is not in the set of cooperative fishing schemes, and hence the choice 
ω 0 indicates that the sector has opted not to coordinate the harvesting activities of its 
members.  
Successful cooperation requires that the sector manager actively coordinate 
members to perform their joint work (i.e. coordinate the tasks ω). I model the 
implementation decisions by the manager as the one-dimensional choice of  . The 
choice of  , however, may entail organizational considerations across many 
                                                 





dimensions. For example, how many exploratory vessels should be surveying for the 
distribution of fish schools? What is the optimal way to accomplish the orderly access to 
the fishing grounds, in order to avoid undesired congested conditions? How is the 
information on current market prices going to be used to determine the target mix of 
species for the catch? An alternative way to model the implementation decisions would 
be to treat  as a vector. However, that would mean dealing with multiple unknown 
parameters, which would limit the tractability of the model. 
I adopt the specification in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) to model how deviations 
from optimal implementation reduce the return of a public input according to a quadratic 
loss function. Hence, the reduction in the unit cost of fishing effort for sector members in 
season t when coordinating ω tasks can be written as: 
 
2.4                                 , ,  
 
where ,  are parameters specific to the fishing scheme ω,  is a normally distributed 
independent disturbance with zero mean and variance σ , and   is a public good input 
determined by members’ contributions. While  is known by the fishermen,  is 
assumed unknown. In expression (2.4), for each set of tasks ω, it is the Euclidean 
distance between the sector manager’s choice  and the realization of  that 
determines the actual return of the public input in reducing cost of effort. The larger the 
deviation from optimal implementation, the lower the return of input used. This 
deviation, in turn, depends on the random disturbance  and on the information on , 




 can be viewed as a random target that the sector manager tries to anticipate when 
implementing the ω tasks. Under optimal implementation (i.e. when  is ‘on target’), the 
reduction in the unit cost of effort is given simply by . I assume that more 
coordination is desirable under perfect information, and thus  for any , 0. 
Thus, in the framework of Buchanan (1965), the sector can be viewed as a club, 
and expression (2.4) as defining the provision of the club service, namely, the reduction 
in the unit cost of fishing effort for sector members.  
Examples of the public good input in (2.4) are the stationary nets placed by the 
Chignik cooperative along the major migration route that funneled the migrating salmon 
stock towards the area where the purse seine were waiting, the artificial reefs (i.e. man-
made objects specifically placed to attract fish, provide or improve fish or shellfish 
habitat, and increase fish biomass locally) installed by the Mugi Higashi Fishermen 
Cooperative Association in Japan, and fish aggregating devices (i.e. structures located at 
the surface or at midwater depths to take advantage of the attraction of pelagic fish to 
floating objects) used by some groups in the Philippines and Japan (FAO Fisheries 
Report No. 474, Supplement Volume 1, 1992). 
As an illustration of (2.4), a collective fishing operation may entail investing in 
man-made reefs and similar devices (i.e. ), as well as coordinating the search for the 
stock in the artificial reef areas (i.e. ω 1  by choosing the number of vessels to send 
searching each period (i.e. = number of searching vessels in t). Sending an excessive 
number of boats would be wasteful due to the duplication of search effort, but too few 
may prevent the group from catching its entire quota.  Furthermore, the optimal number 




changing tides, currents and weather conditions, among numerous other factors (i.e. 
 =optimal number of searching vessels in t).  
While  is unknown to fishermen, fishermen start the first season with prior 
beliefs about it, and those initial beliefs are common to all permit holders in the fishery. I 
assume that prior beliefs are normally distributed and that fishermen update beliefs 
following Bayes’ rule. Each period the sector updates beliefs  upon realizing 
. Conditional on the signal , updated beliefs about  follow a normal 
distribution (De Groot 1970): 
 
2.5                                ~  ,   
 
where  and  respectively denote expectation and variance of  with respect to 
beliefs .  Notice that the updated mean is a convex combination of the prior belief 
and the signal , and that all signals reduce the posterior variance by the factor /
, which is smaller than one. Thus, the variance of the group’s subjective 
beliefs falls through time and converges to zero, that is, in the long run the uncertainty 
about  is fully resolved13. This dynamic of belief formation will have important 
implications later on in the analysis. 
I conclude this section by using the previous definitions to write the expected 
profit of the sector in season t as: 
 
                                                 
13 Note that while the precision of beliefs increases in a fixed, predetermined way, the value of  each 




2.6                   Π C  
 
where p denotes the (exogenous) price of the catch, and  C  the cost of providing the 
public good input X . The function C is twice differentiable and strictly convex.  
From (2.5) and (2.6) it can be seen that, in the model, the learning process is 
prompted by incomplete information, and that the transition function regulating the 
evolution of the sector’s profitability is a result of Bayes’ rule.  
 
2.2.3 Solving the Season’s Game 
Myopic agents make their choices based on optimization of the season’s payoffs. 
I analyze each season starting with the last stage. When deciding whether to become 
members of the sector, fishermen look forward in the season to anticipate that, once the 
fishing starts (stage 3), the sector manager will allocate harvesting times to its members, 
implement the selected scheme ω, and provide the public good input so as to catch the 
sector’s quota at the minimum cost. Moreover, harvesters expect that, before the actual 
fishing starts, when selecting the number of tasks ω to coordinate (stage 2), the manager 
will optimally trade off the benefits from adopting cooperative schemes (i.e. large ω) 
against the costly implementation errors he foresees in light of his limited information. 
It is by comparing the equilibrium profit he can earn in the common pool, as an 
independent, to his expected share of the sector’s profits, that each permit holder decides, 
at the beginning of each season (stage 1), if it is worthwhile to join the sector. In this 




determined by their fishing skills and unit cost of effort. As will be shown later in this 
section, the unambiguous best response for everybody in the fishery is to stay out of the 
sector if harvesters anticipate that, given the manager’s current knowledge on team 
fishing, he will opt not to coordinate any tasks (i.e. ω 0). 
 
2.2.3.1. Stage 3: Optimal Input Choices by Independents in the Common Pool 
 
Each permit holder fishing independently in the common pool solves the 
following program: 
 
2.7                            max
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subject to the condition that the common pool quota is not exceeded:  
 





Equation (2.7) is linear and increasing in the days at sea  if 0. Thus, 
the equilibrium condition for fishermen in the common pool is simply: 
 
2.9                                    
TAC
     0
0                    otherwise





Each active permit holder in the common pool will fish until the fraction of the 
TAC  assigned to independents is caught. Thus, the equilibrium profit for the active 
fishermen in the common pool is: 
 





This expression is clearly increasing in the skill level  (since the (inverse) efficiency 
ratio /  decreases with skill). Note also that (2.10) is independent of the composition 
of the common pool. The reason for this result lies in the way potential sector 
contributions (PSCs) are calculated. An independent fisherman of skill  will catch 
 during season t. As a fraction of the common pool total catch, it amounts 
to / ∑ / ∑ . But this last expression coincides with his PSC . Thus, 
while a highly skilled permit holder may be able to land more fish than his independent 
counterparts, he does so only in proportion to his own contribution to the common pool 
quota. Therefore, his presence in the common pool does not undercut the profitability of 
the other independents.   
Finally, observe that for those fishermen whose optimal choice in (2.9) is 0, 
the potential sector contribution equals zero. In the rest of the chapter I assume that only 
individuals contributing positive catch shares to the sector quota will be admitted as 
members. Under a profit-sharing rule proportional to PSC, inactive fishermen would have 
no incentives to join the sector. Under equal sharing, on the other hand, they would 
increase their profits by becoming members of the sector. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that, regardless of the sector’s internal decision-making process, these individuals 










2.2.3.2. Stage 3: Optimal Input Choices by the Sector Manager 
 
The objective of the sector manager is to maximize total expected profits each 
period. In the third stage, when both sector’s membership and the fishing scheme are 
taken as given, the choice of fishing effort, public good provision, and optimal 
implementation can be found by solving the following maximization problem: 
 
 
2.11       max
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   subject to                              
 
In (2.11) revenues depend on the price of the catch and the sector’s share of the TAC . 
The sector’s share, in turn, is fully specified by the number and skill profile of its 
members. Given the assumption of constant unit cost of effort, it is always optimal for the 
sector to harvest its entire quota (i.e. the constraint in (2.11) is binding). Thus, provided 
the entire quota  is caught, the sector manager will minimize the cost of effort. He will 
do so by consolidating the fleet and assigning positive harvest times to the subset of 
lowest cost members such that the sector’s season lasts the entire time the fish are 
available T.14 When the marginal cost of effort is constant, this is always the optimal 
                                                 








choice.15 Otherwise, the costs could be further decreased simply by reducing the time 
allocated to the least skilled among the active fishermen in favor of a more highly skilled 
member. The optimal assignment of days at sea is defined by (2.12) bellow: 
 
 
argmin   subject to      and     for all    
 
 
Therefore,  for the subset of most skilled fishermen that ensures that the 
sector’s quota is caught (i.e. 0 for the remaining members). This result is consistent 
with the increase in season length associated with the formation of cooperatives such as 
the Chignik Cooperative (the cooperative lengthened the season by an average of 32 
days; Costello et al. 2009), the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (PWCC) (in 
1998, the first year of PWCC operation, the season lasted 83 days, almost 60 days longer 
than previous years; Sylvia et al. 2008), and the cooperatives in the North Pacific Pollock 
fishery (the season length went from 75 days in 1998 to 149 days in 1999 after the 
creation of the cooperatives; Sanchirico 2008).  
Note also that when the sector fleet is overcapitalized, that is, when ∑ , 
condition (12) implies that the least efficient members (such as fisherman 1) will not fish 
during the season.  
 
From the first order condition of (2.11) with respect to , it is immediate that the optimal 
implementation choice is given by: 
                                                 
15  If marginal costs of effort are not constant, efficiency requires marginal costs of each effort type to be 





2.13                                                                
 
Not surprisingly, (2.13) sets the optimal implementation choice equal to the 
expected value of the technology specific parameter . The rationale for this condition 
is that   is a quadratic loss function, in which deviations above and 
below the target  reduce the return of the input used . For example, if the sector is 
coordinating one task, namely the search for fish, then  corresponds to the number of 
searching vessels the sector manager sends to locate the stocks. Expression (2.13) 
indicates that what is relevant for the actual performance of the sector is not the optimal 
number of exploratory vessels to send searching for fish (i.e. ), but how close the 
number of vessels the manager sends is to that optimal number of exploratory boats. 
Sending an excessive number of boats would be wasteful due to the duplication of search 
effort, but too few may prevent the group from catching its entire quota. 
Substituting (2.12) and (2.13) into the first order condition of (2.11) with respect to , 
we obtain: 
 
2.14                                     0 
 
 
where 0 and (2.14) holds with equality if 0. Thus, at the optimum the 
Samuelson condition must be satisfied. For the public good input in question, the 
summation of each member’s marginal benefits must be set equal to the marginal cost of 
provision. Note however, that equation (2.14) defines the optimal provision conditional 




information. To see this notice that the first term in the left hand side of (2.14) is 
decreasing in σ and C X  is strictly convex. Hence the lack of perfect information on 
 translates into a faulty decision  by the sector manager, and, for a given number of 
sector members, into under provision of the public good input.  
  
Finally, using expressions (2.12)-(2.14), the sector’s maximized profit in the third stage 
can be written as: 
 
2.15         Π | ,  C  
 
The first term in the right hand side of (2.15) equals the profits of fishing the quota with a 
rationalized fleet, and the second term corresponds to the expected net gains from 
adopting cooperative fishing when the sector implements ω tasks. These latter gains are 
realized as further reductions in the unit costs of fishing. Note that  does not enter 
in equation (2.15), since the size of  does not affect sector’s success. As it was 
mentioned above, it is only the Euclidean distance between  and the true  that 
matters. In (2.15) the posterior precision on  can be viewed as the stock of social 
capital of the group. As sector members use the new fishing technique, they also observe 
 and learn more about , which allows the sector manager to make a better 
decision . This reduces the posterior variance  and raises the expected profit of 
the sector. Note that in the model the choice of inputs by the sector manager does not 
affect the realization of . Thus, the decisions of the sector manager, like the 
allocation of fishing times among members, have no effect on the evolution of beliefs 









2.2.3.3. Stage 2: Selecting the Fishing Scheme 
 
Each season the sector manager selects the number of tasks to coordinate, learns 
from that experience, and then chooses a new set of tasks to implement the following 
season.  
The link between different cooperative schemes is informational. Concretely, if 
the sector is coordinating ω tasks, and the alternative is to coordinate  tasks, with 
Ω, I define ⁄ . The parameters  and  are specific to the 
fishing schemes ω and , respectively, and define the closeness of both techniques. 
From this definition it follows that / , and the ratio /  can be 
viewed as measuring the transferability of the sector’s information to a different set of 
tasks. If, for example,    for any , 0, information is fully transferrable 
across fishing techniques. If, conversely, , the sector’s previously acquired 
knowledge on  is only partially transferrable to schemes with more tasks. In this later 
case, the increasing organizational complexity associated with the coordination of larger 
number of tasks translates into poor guesses on  and faulty implementation choices 
.  
In a derby fishery where permit holders have historically raced for their share of 




collective fishing. Consequently, I assume that the larger the number of tasks to 
coordinate under a particular fishing scheme (i.e. the more cooperative the scheme), the 
less familiar fishermen are with it (i.e.   for any , 0). 
Recalling that one is the minimum number of tasks in Ω, it is possible to rewrite the 
definition of  above as , where  has been normalized to one. In 
this last expression,  can be interpreted as the specificity of the fishing technique 
.  
Using these definitions, expression (2.15) can be rewritten as function of the beliefs on 
, that is, as a function of fishermen’s information on the least cooperative of the fishing 
schemes in Ω: 
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where  denotes the variance of beliefs about  in season t. In (2.16), for each ω Ω, 
the pair ,  determines the return of the fishing scheme in reducing unit cost of 
effort. The actual return of the inputs used on cost reduction depends not only on  but 
also on the deviations from optimal implementation. These deviations, in turn, will 
depend on the sector’s accumulated knowledge on , and the transferability of this 
knowledge, as measured by   .  
Define the following function Γ , and rewrite equation (2.16) 
as: 





By the envelope theorem on (2.17) it is immediate that Π | ,  is increasing in Γ .16 
Hence, the choice, in the second stage, of the optimal number of tasks to coordinate in 
season t can be obtained by solving: 
 




There is a basic trade-off built into expression (2.18). Upgrading fishing techniques 
allows the sector to make more efficient use of the public good input, as   for 
any , 0. However, upgrading implies a loss of information as well, as , 
and implies larger expected errors in implementation. Which effect dominates critically 
depends on the current knowledge on  and the characteristics of the fishing schemes in 
ω Ω. To see this, note that, according to (2.18), the sector manager prefers a scheme 
with ω n  tasks over the coordination of ω tasks, as long as  
.17 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below, illustrate the selection of the optimal set of tasks when 
Ω 1, ,  for two possible cases: (i)   for all n, with , Ω, 
and (ii)   for all n, with , Ω,  
In (i), the loss of information when upgrading to a more cooperative harvesting scheme 
outweighs the efficiency gains from coordinating more tasks. Thus, in case (i) the fishing 
                                                 
16 Note that by the time the sector chooses the optimal level of contribution to the public good input X , the 
fishing scheme ω and the current beliefs  are taken as given, so in equation (2.17)  Γω can be viewed 
as a parameter.  
17 If  and z had been defined, instead,  as continuous variables of ω, the corresponding first order condition 





techniques in Ω exhibit ‘decreasing returns to tasks’ due to incomplete information. This 
is likely to be the case when the schemes in Ω differ substantially from one another, as 
when incorporating new tasks calls for the reorganization of the collective operation. In 
other words, limited information in the face of growing coordination difficulty limits the 
scope of the sector. For example, the transition from a decentralized operation that 
prevents congestion externalities by rotating access to the fishing grounds, to a scheme 
where a fleet manager coordinates both the collective search and harvest of the stock, 
assigning who fishes where and when based on weather conditions and stock distribution 
(indeed the role of the fleet manager in the case of Chilean fishing companies; Oshe 
Consultores S.A. 2006), entails a substantial reorganization of the sector’s day-to-day 
activities. In figure 2.2, it is this assumption and the linearity of  Γ  that guarantee the 
existence (and uniqueness) of the intersection points labeled E, F, G and H.18 
Assume first that the sector manager’s current beliefs  are such that ,  
where / 1  and  . In this case, the optimal choice is to 
coordinate 1 task, as this is the fishing technique that returns the largest expected 
reduction in unit cost of effort per dollar contributed by sector members. In figure 2.2 this 
is patent from the fact that, within that range of , Γ  is highest along EF. Note that the 
manager makes his choice entirely aware of the superior efficiency of the alternative 
schemes (i.e. ). It is his current lack of information (i.e. 0), and the 
attendant implementation errors ( ) that leads the manager to 
disregard more cooperative schemes and choose one task instead. In other words, fishing 
                                                 
18 Adding fishing schemes to Ω would increase the number of intersection points (i.e. such as F and G) in 
figure 2.2, but it would not change the analysis. In the limit, as Ω becomes an interval in the positive real 




schemes involving larger number of tasks are more informationally intensive, and that 
limits their use by the sector. Indeed, in figure 2.2, both Γ  and Γ  are actually 



















While  is constant in the model, beliefs are dynamic and defined each season by (2.5). 
In (2.5), beliefs’ precision increases gradually and the variance converges to zero as 
sector members observe new signals.  If in season t the sector is coordinating one task, 
then there are three possibilities for the operation the following season: (1) the updated 
variance /  is such that , and there is no upgrading 






Optimally choose to coordinate one task E’

















/ , and the manager’s optimal choice in season t+1 is to 
coordinate n tasks (i.e. a move along FG in figure 2.2); or (3) , and the sector 
coordinates n+M tasks (i.e. a move along GH). Once n+M tasks have been selected, no 
further upgrading is possible and the sector manager job’s reduces to perfecting the 
implementation of those n+M tasks as he acquires additional information each period. In 
the long-run, the uncertainty on  is fully resolved and the return of the input used in 
reducing the cost of effort is maximized and given by  (i.e. point H in figure 
2.2).  
In the absence of decreasing return to tasks (i.e. case (ii)) there is no trade off –regardless 
of beliefs– involved in the choice of a larger number of tasks to coordinate. This situation 
is illustrated in figure 2.3. Incomplete information remains costly (i.e. 1), but 
the loss of knowledge upon upgrading is outweighed by the efficiency gains from 
coordinating a larger number of tasks (i.e. ). Contrary to case (i), this is likely to 
happen when the schemes in Ω are similar, as when upgrading simply adds tasks to the 
existing operation, without reorganization. If, for example, the sector manager already 
coordinates information on targeted stock locations, the extension of the scheme to 
sharing and coordinating data on bycatch should be fairly straightforward. Under a TAC 
management system that assigns quotas to all the species caught (targeted and non-
targeted) and non-selective fishing gear, the identification of areas where high bycatch is 
likely to occur may have an important impact on profitability.19  Graphically this means 
that the functions Γω do not intersect in the first quadrant as before. Under these 
                                                 
19 Both the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative and the Alaskan Pollock Conservation Cooperative 
report catch and bycatch data electronically to Sea State, a private firm specializing in fisheries data 
collection and analysis. Sea State assembles the data and reports back to coop vessels on a real-time basis, 




circumstances, the sector manager always prefers the choice of n+M tasks over the 























Note that the two cases in (i) and (ii), illustrated respectively in figures 2.2 and 2.3, have 
been presented separately only for exposition purposes. However, it is likely that in the 
same set Ω, some of the harvesting schemes exhibit property (i) (i.e. they differ 
substantially, and hence the transferability of information among them is limited) while 
others are characterized by (ii) (i.e. they are very much alike). 
Finally, neither in figure 2.2 nor in figure 2.3 is cooperation in the sector 















H Optimally choose to coordinate n+M tasks 
Figure 2.3: Task-choice path as a function of accumulated knowledge  




max Ω / , characterizes a threshold for the initial prior’s variance, 
beyond which none of the schemes ω Ω generates positive returns in the reduction of 
cost of effort.  Indeed, for priors such that , the benefits from cooperation are 
outweighed by the expected losses associated with implementation errors. Therefore, if 
initial beliefs are characterized by a low precision prior, a myopic manager maximizes 
expected (current) profits by consolidating the fleet and letting active members fish 
independently from one another (i.e. by selecting ω 0). This, however, is an 
undesirable outcome from a welfare standpoint, as it entails a suboptimal long-run 
equilibrium for the fishery. By selecting ω 0, the sector forsakes valuable signals each 
season, renounces to learning by doing, and effectively limits its choice set each season to 
the mere consolidation of the fleet.  




(i) The sector manager chooses to coordinate a positive number of tasks  if and 
only if his initial beliefs are such that  0,  / , where 
 denotes the unknown parameter corresponding to the least cooperative (i.e. 
coordination of a single task) fishing scheme in Ω. 
(ii) If the sector chooses to coordinate a positive number of tasks and there exists 
 such that , where | , then the manager’s 
optimal choice is characterized by the coordination of a progressively larger 




according to the condition  for all , and 
endogenous upgrading guarantees that | . 
(iii)  If the sector chooses to coordinate a positive number of tasks and  for 
all , then the manager’s optimal choice is given by the largest number of 
available tasks  | , regardless of .  
 
The proof of results (i)-(iii) follows immediately from the specification of Bayes’ 
rule in (2.5) and pointwise optimization on (2.18). Indeed, as it was pointed out earlier, it 
is the learning process as defined by the updating of beliefs that prompts the evolution of 
the sector’s profitability.  
Results (i)–(iii) highlight the importance, for sector operations, of fishermen’s 
expectations concerning the possibility of boosting profitability through collective 
fishing. These expectations, in turn, depend critically on the knowledge permit holders 
have about how to organize and implement team-fishing. When sector members hold 
little previous information on how to coordinate the group operation and thus expect to 
make costly mistakes in implementation, they may choose to disregard any coordination 
of tasks (result (i)). As mentioned before, pair-trawling, as used in Scandinavia and 
Southern Europe, is an example of a cooperative harvesting technique whose use is 
limited by the need for finely-tuned coordination between vessels (Gabriel et al. 2005). 
Pair trawling may increase the profitability of the cooperating boats and allow small-scale 
fishermen to compete with larger trawlers. However, this fishing technique requires that 
vessels match their actions and maneuvers closely (i.e. so as to keep a constant distance 




or for shooting the net) and that skippers coordinate their efforts continuously, acting as a 
single unit. This coordination is challenging for captains, especially at night or during bad 
weather conditions, and mistakes resulting in loss or damaged gear can be expensive 
(Gabriel et al 2005, National Research Council 1988). Proposition 1.(i) states that 
fishermen will adopt pair-trawling if and only if they expect this fishing scheme to be 
more profitable than individual trawling. Their beliefs in the possibilities of coordination 
will be critical in this assessment.  
Alternatively, sector members may decide to start with a simple fishing operation, (i.e. 
one that calls for the coordination of a few tasks) and only gradually expand the scope of 
their cooperation as the group builds up experience with team harvesting.  Result (ii) 
shows that this is indeed the optimal strategy when permit holders have had little 
previous experience with collective fishing and the harvesting schemes become 
progressively difficult to implement as more tasks are added (i.e. there exists ω Ω such 
that ). Not surprisingly, some of the most sophisticated collective fishing 
arrangements have evolved in Japan, where fishing cooperatives associated with coastal 
communities have a tradition of centuries (Uchida 2007). Only in the absence of tradeoffs 
associated with the adoption of complex schemes, will sectors opt for the coordination of 
a large number of tasks from the outset (result (iii)). 
 
 
2.2.3.4. Stage 1: Committing to the Sector 
 
Using the results of stages 2 and 3, the maximized expected profit for the sector in season 
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where ,  and  are defined by (2.12), (2.14) and (2.18), respectively. Expression 
(2.19) is weakly increasing each season, because learning over time translates into 
progressively smaller errors in the implementation of tasks20. The actual path of sector 
profits, however, will depend on the draws of . The expected profit for sector member j 
in season t can be written as: 
 
2.20                                 | Π Γ  
where  is member j’s fraction of sector profits under sharing rule . Note that, 
everything else equal, identical shares 1/N  will tend to be favored by low skilled 
sector members (i.e. | ∑ /N ). Different sharing rules, however, will 
typically result in equilibria with different sector membership’s profiles.  
 
According to proposition 1, there are two possible cases to consider in stage 1.  
 
The Case of No Coordination ( ) 
 
I first analyze the case where   max Ω / . By proposition 1-(i), the 
optimal choice of tasks is given by ω 0, for all t. Thus, under the two profit-sharing 
rules considered in this chapter, equation (2.20) can be rewritten simply as |
                                                 
20 For expression (2.19) to weakly increase each period, theTAC  must either remain at the same level or 




Π , where  is defined either as 1 N⁄  or as ∑⁄ . Using the definition of Π  and 
∑⁄  write: 
 




By comparing (2.21) with the profit fisherman j can make as an independent in the 
common pool, TAC , it is clear that in both cases revenues coincide 
with the value of his PSC .  Thus, it is the comparison of the costs under the two 
alternatives that finally determines whether fishermen join the sector. 
When evaluating the convenience of committing to the sector, fisherman N (i.e. 
the most skilled permit holder in the fishery) is aware of the fact that, regardless of the 
skills of other members in S , it is optimal for the sector manager to allocate him a 
positive fishing time. Thus, he anticipates that: either he is able to catch the entire sector 
quota by himself (i.e. his is the only active vessel in the sector fleet), or he catches the 
sector quota together with other members. If he catches the entire sector quota, his profit 
in (2.21) becomes: 
 




which reduces to: 
 





Expression (2.23) coincides with the profit he would make in the common pool, and thus 
fisherman N has no incentives to join the sector if he expects to be the only active 
member in the fleet. The other possibility, namely that he catches the sector quota 
together with other members, is however, unambiguously inferior for fisherman N. To 
see this, recall that for an individual fisherman the cost of a catch q is proportional to his 
⁄  ratio (i.e. for fisherman i it is equal to ⁄ ⁄ ). Thus, the assignment of 
positive fishing times to less skilled members than N, necessarily increases the total cost 
of effort above the level in (2.23), as this cost becomes a weighted average of ⁄  that are 
higher than ⁄ . This makes it suboptimal for N to join the sector.  
So far I have shown that the most skilled fishermen will always stay in the common pool 
as long as it is optimal for the sector not to coordinate any tasks, ω 0. The equilibrium 
for the entire fishery can now be derived as follows: foreseeing N’s dominant strategy, 
the next most skilled fishermen, harvester N-1, faces an identical problem as N’s. Hence, 
with fisherman N in the common pool, the best response for fisherman N-1 is always to 
stay out of the sector. As this reasoning unravels, it becomes obvious that, with the 
exception of the least skilled permit holder in the fishery (i.e. fisherman 1), every agent’s 
best reply is to remain independent. Therefore, when fishermen anticipate ω 0, the 
sector is effectively prevented from forming.  
The same reasoning is trivially extended to the case of identical shares (i.e. 1/
N ) and therefore I omit it here.   






Proposition 2:  
 
If fishermen’s initial beliefs are characterized by  / , where 
 denotes the unknown parameter corresponding to the least cooperative (i.e. 
coordination of a single task) fishing scheme in Ω, and the sharing rule  is defined by 
either 1/  or / ∑ , then every permit holder in the fishery remains 
in the common pool and the sector does not form.  
 
If indeed “almost miraculously, fishers who move on from ITQs to a self-regulatory-
regime are likely to succeed” (Scott 2000, p.116), one would expect to see the 
spontaneous emergence of cooperation among catch-share holders to be the norm in 
commercial fisheries with defined property rights. However, it is infrequent today to find 
quota holders pooling their shares of the TAC and fishing cooperatively, despite the 
potential efficiency gains associated with this strategy (Townsend et al., 2008). What is 
the reason for this apparent anomaly? Proposition 2 states that it suffices for fishermen to 
be unfamiliar enough with cooperative collective harvesting for them to (optimally) 
choose independent fishing. This is a relevant result as it helps to explain why fishermen 
fail to cooperate even when nobody is expected to cheat on the group’s agreed upon 
rules. Note also that this conclusion is obtained in a fishery in which harvesters’ skills are 
common knowledge, and thus it differs from adverse selection arguments that rely on 
asymmetric information on permit holders’ types. It is not incomplete information on 
individual fishing skills that drives the result, but the lack of perfect knowledge on how to 





The Case of Coordination ( 0) 
 
I transcribe equation (2.19) here: 
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Using the definition of Π  and  proportional to PSC, individual j’s profit from joining 
the sector is: 
 




Γ C   
 
The second term on the right hand side of (2.25) is simply the share of the net benefits 
from coordination that accrues to each member. This term is always nonnegative and 
adds to the profits obtained from harvesting the sector quota with a consolidated fleet.  
First note that, for fisherman 1, it is a dominant strategy to join the sector. Being the least 
skill harvester, he is always better off joining other fishermen (i.e. even if ω 0). 
Fisherman 2 knows this fact.21 Thus, if the initial beliefs lead him to expect ω 0, he 
will join the sector only if: (a) he expects to be the most skilled fisherman to join, but 
even in this case coordination makes sector membership more profitable than 
independent fishing (i.e. | 1,2  ), or (b) if, upon him joining, he expects 
x additional fishermen to become members (i.e. it is a best response for the remaining of 
the first 2 harvesters to join in t, and for the rest to stay independent) and |
                                                 




1,2,3, … , 2  . Fishermen 2 reason in a similar manner. Recalling that the 
profits fishermen can make in the common pool (equation (2.10)) are increasing in skill 
, the previous reasoning results in the successive joining of higher skilled harvesters. If 
m denotes the marginal independent, the equilibrium of the sector-formation game each 
season can be written as the following partition of the set of fishermen between the sector 
and the common pool: S |  and CP |  for 1, … , . To see 
that this is indeed the case, notice from (2.10) and (2.25) that it is never a best response 
for a harvester of skill  to remain in the common pool if the equilibrium strategy of any 
higher skill fisherman is to join the sector. 
Since sector members’ expected profit, as given by (2.25), is weakly increasing 
due to learning, it is never optimal for a member to abandon the sector. Furthermore, as 
the posterior variance of  decreases each period, additional fishermen are expected to 
be attracted to the group in the ‘continuation games’. The specific dynamics for the 
sector’s expected profits, however, will depend on whether it is optimal for the manager 
to gradually upgrade techniques or to select the largest number of tasks immediately (see 
section 3.3.3.). Since the learning process is bounded (lim 0), the sector’s size 
will stabilize in the long run, after a steady increase in membership in previous seasons.   
Identical arguments can be applied to derive the equilibrium of the fishery each season 
when 1/N ). With identical shares, the sector will tend to be smaller than under 
sharing based on quota contributions, and the average skill level lower. The reason, as it 
was pointed out before, is that, everything else equal, identical shares are preferred by 
low skilled fishermen (i.e. | ∑ /N ). 





Proposition 3:  
 
If fishermen’s initial beliefs are characterized by  0,  / , 
where  denotes the unknown parameter corresponding to the least cooperative (i.e. 
coordination of a single task) fishing scheme in Ω, and the sharing rule  is defined by 
either 1/  or / ∑ , then the fishery’s equilibrium each season is 
given by the partition: |  and | , where the marginal 
independent m is uniquely defined by the conditions | 1,2,3, … , 1
 and | 1,2,3, … , . 
 
For the sharing rule  / ∑ , the conditions defining the marginal independent m 
can be rewritten as: 
 




∑ TAC     
and 




∑ TAC  
 
The left hand side in (2.26) and (2.27) represents the fisherman’s share of the net benefits 
from cooperation within the sector, when its members coordinate ω  tasks. The specific 
composition of the sector defines the optimal allocation of fishing times  among 
harvesters.  
Under a sharing rule proportional to quota contribution, each sector member receives as 
revenue the value of his quota, which coincides with the revenue he would earn as an 
independent in the common pool. Fishermen share the cost of harvesting the sector’s 




sector, this cost share is larger than the cost of catching his quota as an independent. The 
right hand side in (2.26) represents fisherman m-1’s expected increase in the cost of 
catching his quota upon joining the sector. The same holds for fisherman m in (2.27). 
Thus, m is the first permit holder in the fishery for whom the net benefits from 
coordination are insufficient to compensate for the increase he expects in the cost of 
earning his quota as a  sector member.  
 
The proof of proposition 3 follows immediately from the equilibrium strategies identified 
above for fisherman 1 and fishermen 2, and the definitions of   and |  in 
(2.10) and (2.20). 
Proposition 3 indicates that, in the scenario that sectors do form, the least skilled permit 
holders in the fishery are expected to join first.  These fishermen benefit the most from 
cooperation, as they are unlikely to fish for the sector (i.e. the sector fleet is rationalized) 
and hence expect to profit from the higher skills of other members. As sectors experiment 
with collective fishing and extend the scope of their cooperation, their expected profits 
increase, attracting progressively more skilled fishermen. In the long run equilibrium, 
only the most skilled permit holders remain in the common pool and fish independently. 
This result is consistent with, for example, evidence from the Chignik salmon fishery, 
where the historic catch shares for fishermen who remained independent (highliners) 









2.3   Discussion 
The results in the previous section have been derived under the assumption that 
fishermen behave myopically and make their choices to optimize current season profits. 
The long-run equilibrium derived for the fishery under this assumption coincides with the 
long-term equilibrium supported by farsighted harvesters. Here I discuss the rationale for 
this result.  
One of the requirements of Amendment 16 is that fishermen ratify their decisions 
regarding sector affiliation on an annual basis. It is precisely this built-in flexibility to 
adjust their decisions on sector membership and sector’s fishing rules that makes permit 
holders’ choices reversible. Indeed, once sectors have formed, and unless sector members 
themselves decide to incorporate restrictions to new membership in the bylaws, this 
periodic opportunity to revise the choices made in the previous season makes it optimal 
for farsighted harvesters to behave as myopic agents. To see this, recall that in the model 
learning in the sector only depends on the repeated experimentation with collective 
fishing (i.e. on the decision to coordinate a positive number of tasks) but not on the 
specific member composition of the sector. Thus, a harvester facing the decision to join 
the group, knows that by staying in the common pool for another period he does not 
compromise the learning (and hence, the optimal choice of tasks) within the sector. This 
means that, by choosing to stay out of the sector for one more season, the permit holder is 
not limiting his choice set in the future, as the next season he will face the same decision 
problem as this period. In the meantime, however, he will have gained the difference 




member of the sector. In other words, for this fisherman there is no tradeoff in the 
decision to postpone joining the sector by one period. In these conditions, the 
optimization over the entire horizon effectively reduces to an infinite series of 
independent, one-season optimization problems, and the optimal solution reduces to 
choosing the most profitable option each period. 
There is, however, an important caveat to the above argument. If fishermen start 
with a low precision prior,  max Ω / , it is known from proposition 
2 that the sector will fail to form. This outcome, in turn, reduces the future choice set of 
all the permit holders in the fishery. Under these circumstances, it may be optimal for 
farsighted fishermen to join the sector and invest in learning for one or several seasons, 
even if this means giving up higher profits in the common pool in the meantime. Future 
profits resulting from active cooperation within the sector may make this investment 
worthwhile. Unfortunately, this strategy is not a best response for any permit holder. To 
see this, assume that farsighted players join the sector in the first period if the infinite 
stream of payments associated with this strategy is higher than the payoffs from fishing in 
the common pool. Then, the following deviation increases the payoff for any of them: 
remain in the common pool and postpone joining the sector until the next period. By 
doing so, a fisherman earns the difference between his profits in the common pool and 
those he would have obtained as a sector member in the current season, yet still benefits 
from the investment in learning undertaken by others. Hence, the formation of the sector 






2.4 Concluding Remarks 
That race for fish is wasteful and dangerous is well documented. This harvesting 
strategy leads to overinvestment in fishing inputs and induces such behavior as fishing in 
bad weather and delaying needed repairs. Derby fishing also shortens the fishing season, 
which generates shortages and gluts in the market. The rationale for this dissipation of 
rent lies in the fact that limited licensing assigns only a right to fish, not a property right 
to the fish resource. Individual catch-shares, especially ITQs, are frequently hailed as the 
best-suited management tool to align the economic interests of fishermen with ecological 
and safety concerns. However, ITQs have shortcomings. They may exacerbate 
“highgrading”, the tendency of fishers to discard smaller fish in hope of catching larger, 
more valuable ones, they create no incentives for quota holders to coordinate fishing 
effort or share information, and they are highly contentious in the political arena, 
especially when it comes to agreeing on the initial allocation of individual quotas. Sector 
allocations are an attractive alternative to ITQs and it is therefore worth studying the 
conditions that make their implementation viable.  
Sector allocations may contribute to rebuilding depleted stocks and increasing 
industry profits, thereby improving the quality of life of permit holders as well as the 
marine ecosystem. However, the transition from independent, competitive fishing to 
collective harvesting may be challenging for fishermen, especially if they have had little 
earlier experience with cooperative initiatives.  
The success of sectors is likely to rest partly on the strength of the relationships 
among fishermen, including their degree of trust and collaboration. It is reasonable to 




and learning over time. This may represent an opportunity for fishing communities (i.e. 
port-based, fishing-dependent communities). Indeed, community-based sectors could 
provide the means for a community and its fishermen to retain or regain access to the 
fishery and to ensure that the community benefits from this access (Holland 2007). This 
possibility contrasts with the feared marginalization of fishing communities usually 
associated with the adoption of an ITQ system (Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). 
The analysis in this chapter highlights the relevance of addressing the question of 
what types of training programs would help accelerate the learning process and boost the 
adoption of collective arrangements of self-governance. Building capacity among 
fishermen to organize and administer sectors will likely entail documenting previous 
experiences to encourage learning from successful case studies, and coaching and 
guidance on institutional design. The regulator should pay attention to this matter, as it 
could have serious policy implications in terms of reducing the long-term economic and 
environmental costs of the transition. It is ultimately in the public interest for the 




Chapter 3: Empirical Framework 
 
The main objective of this third chapter is to present the empirical framework that 
will be used to test some of the implications of the model introduced in chapter 2. 
Specifically, I focus on the following predictions of the theoretical model: i) previous 
experience with team harvesting facilitates the formation of cooperative-type business 
arrangements (i.e. sectors), ii) least-skilled fishermen have incentives to join sectors first, 
and iii) learning-by-doing increases the returns of cooperation over time within sectors. 
Using technical efficiency as a proxy for fishing skill (Kirkley et al. 1998, Viswanathan 
et al. 2002, Hoff and Frost 2005) and utilizing a panel data set from the hook gear fleet in 
the New England Multispecies Fishery, I estimate a system of equations comprised of 
stochastic output distance function and a technical inefficiency model (Battesse and 
Coelli 1992, 1995). The framework allows for the simultaneous characterization of the 
underlying technology and the determination of the key factors impacting efficiency. 
The contribution of this chapter to the applied fisheries economics literature is 
threefold. First, and unlike most empirical studies of fisheries production frontiers which 
implicitly assume input-output separability and estimate a weighted aggregate measure of 
output as function of inputs, this study uses a primal multi-output distance function 
approach, allowing for the testing of the separability assumption and the derivation of the 
ability of fishermen to alter their output mix. Second, the analysis is applied to a long 
panel data, and unlike short-term studies, it explicitly incorporates the variability of 




the effect of fishermen’s interactions on efficiency in order to identify cooperation among 
harvesters. 
 
3.1 Previous Literature 
 
The literature on productivity and efficiency in fisheries and cooperation in the 
commons is extensive and this review is not intended as a comprehensive assessment of 
the research conducted in these areas. Rather, it reviews articles that deal specifically 
with three topics that are pertinent to the empirical methodology discussed later in the 
chapter: i) empirical evidence on the connection between technical efficiency and skipper 
characteristics, ii) characterization of technical efficiency in multispecies fisheries, and 
iii) empirical research investigating cooperative behavior in the commons. 
 
Technical Efficiency and Skipper Skills 
Kirkley et al. (1998) represented the first attempt in the fisheries economics 
literature to relate technical efficiency with management (skippers) skill. To this end, the 
authors used a two-stage approach: first, they estimated a stochastic production function 
to determine technical efficiency (TE) scores, and subsequently they regressed (using a 
truncated model) TE scores on variables that proxy for skill level, skipper’s years of 
education and years of experience in the Mid-Atlantic sea scallop fishery. Using trip level 
data for the years 1987-1990 for the dredge fleet, they found a positive relationship 
between both skipper’s education and experience and vessel performance, as given by 




instead of the single-stage approach introduced by Coelli and Battese (1993). This later 
methodology is preferred, as it avoids the inconsistency of assumptions implied by the 
uses of two separate steps.22  
Viswanathan et al. (2002) analyzed the Kedah trawl fishery in Malaysia using 
season-level (i.e. normal, peak and off season) data for the year 1995. The authors 
estimated a stochastic production function and an inefficiency model to assess the 
influence on vessels’ technical efficiencies of boat size, skipper’s years of experience, 
ethnicity and similar factors. While vessel size indeed proved to be a determinant of 
efficiency, the results provided inconclusive support to the hypothesis that the skipper’s 
experience greatly impacts efficiency. A limitation of the methodology used in the paper 
is the adoption of a single-output specification (a production function in which output 
was measured as the geometric mean of all species landed, where revenue shares served 
as weights) for the analysis of a multispecies fishery. This approach imposes restrictions 
on the technology (such as input-output separability on the transformation function; see 
Pascoe and Mardle (2003)) that may be at odds with the underlying data generating 
process.  
Hoff and Frost (2003) studied the link between technical efficiencies and skipper 
characteristics for different gear segments of the Danish commercial fleet. They used 
monthly data for the year 2002 and the multi-stage approach introduced by Fried et al. 
(1999) to conclude that, for the three major trawl segments of the Danish fishing fleet, 
                                                 
22In the first stage, the production frontier is estimated and the technical efficiency of each unit derived. 
These are subsequently regressed against the set of variables which are hypothesized to influence the unit’s 
efficiency. There is an inconsistency, however, in this two-stage approach. As noted by Battese and Coelli 
(1995), the stochastic  production frontier is estimated in the first stage under the assumption that the 
inefficiency effects (error term) are identically distributed, while in the second stage the predicted technical 
efficiencies are regressed upon a number of unit (i.e. firm, vessel, etc) specific factors, hence suggesting the 




exogenous factors beyond the control of the skipper are the major reasons for high 
inefficiencies, rather than skippers’ skill. Standard input-oriented (output-oriented) DEA 
models assume that inputs (outputs) are discretionary or controllable. The approach in 
Fried et al. (1999) deals with nondiscretionary or environmental factors in four-stages. 
The first phase consists of solving a basic DEA model without environmental factors. In 
a second-stage, regression equations are estimated for each input, where the dependent 
variable is, in each equation, the total amount of input (radial plus non-radial) slack and 
the independent variables are environmental. In a third phase, the actual input levels are 
adjusted by a factor that equals the difference between the maximum predicted slack 
minus the predicted slack value. In a final stage, these adjusted values are included in a 
basic DEA model whose results take environmental factors into account. This approach is 
supposed to effectively deal with non-discretionary variables, but there is little consensus 
among researchers.23 
Squires et al. (2003) studied artisanal gillnet fisheries in the east and west coasts 
of Malaysia to examine which factors were constraining technical efficiency. They used 
cross-sectional data corresponding to the year 1988 to estimate two separate translog 
stochastic production frontiers models, one for each of the coasts. To test for the factors 
that may have been contributing to technical inefficiency, they simultaneously estimated 
                                                 
23For details on this approach, see the volume “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency and Productivity 
Growth” (2008), edited by Fried, Lovell and Schmidt. Note also that the popular two-stage DEA procedure, 
an alternative approach to handle nondiscretionary factors, has been shown to exhibit substantial bias. In 
this method DEA is first conducted using only traditional (discretionary) inputs and outputs, and then the 
first-stage DEA efficiency scores are regressed on the environmental (non-discretionary) inputs of interest. 
Variants of this approach use tobit models rather than traditional regression models in the second stage to 
account for the fact that efficiency scores are bounded between 0 and 1. One problem of the two-stage 
approach relates to the possible correlation between input-output factors used to calculate the efficiency 
scores and the independent variables used in the second stage model. Another problem is that DEA 
efficiency scores are dependent on each other, which “violates a basic assumption required by regression 
analysis: the assumption of independence within sample” (Xue and Harker, quoted in Fried et. al 2008). 




a technical inefficiency model in which, among other independent variables,  the 
captain’s years of fishing experience and his family size were included. For the east coast 
vessels, both explanatory variables were shown to have a significant effect on efficiency, 
suggesting that additional experience and the extra responsibility associated with a larger 
number of family-dependents tended to increase vessel’s performance.  
Tingley et al. (2005) analyzed the effect of vessel and skipper characteristics on 
the technical efficiency (TE) of different segments (mobile gear, potters and net-liners) of 
the English Channel fisheries. The authors used two alternative methodologies to study 
the determinants of TE. First, they estimated a single-output translog stochastic 
production frontier model with technical efficiency effects, and secondly they calculated 
TE scores using non-stochastic, linear-programming Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and used a tobit-regression of the DEA-derived scores to assess the influence of factors 
such as formal education and the availability of navigational aid devices. The authors 
used yearly catch data for the period 1993-1998 and information from a skipper’s survey 
to show that for some of the gear segments, skippers’ experience (for potters) and a 
family history in the fishing industry (for net-liners) had a significant and positive effect 
on efficiency. These results were found to be consistent across the DEA and stochastic 
frontier models. Since the authors analyzed a multispecies fishery, a potential limitation 
of their approach, as the authors themselves acknowledged, was the use of a single-output 
specification. Furthermore, the use of revenue per vessel as output is problematic, 
because: i) changes in prices are accounted for as changes in output, and ii) it implies the 
assumption that output prices do not differ across vessels. In their paper, the authors did 




Esmaeili (2006) studied the Iranian fisheries in the Northern Persian Gulf in order 
to identify the key determinants of technical efficiency.  The author used data on vessels 
operating in 1993 to estimate a stochastic production function and an inefficiency model 
in which technical inefficiencies depended on both vessel and skipper characteristics.  
The results of the analysis confirmed that vessel instrumentation (i.e. presence of GPS 
and a two-way radio) and skipper’s level of education and years of experience in the 
fishery had a significant impact on efficiency. As in the cases of Viswanathan et al. 
(2002) and Tingley et al. (2005) discussed above, a potential limitation of the approach is 
the specification of a single output model to analyze a multispecies fishery (Esmaeili 
used aggregated catch across species as a measure of output). 
 
Multi-output Specifications and Technical Efficiency 
Weninger (2001) analyzed changes in productivity in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam 
and quahog fishery. To this end, the author used data envelopment analysis to 
characterize the technology (using the directional distance function representation) and 
study the shifts in the efficient production frontier (EPF) over time (what the author 
referred to as changes in the bioeconomic productivity of the fishery). His findings 
confirmed claims that surf clam stock had increased in the 1980-1994 and ocean quahog 
biomass declined over the period 1991-1994. The author concluded that the clam 
harvesting technology was flexible and thus input-output substitution possibilities 
allowed fishermen to adjust production activities in response to regulations imposed by 
management. Lacking stock biomass information, however, the author is unable to 




Furthermore, the use of deterministic DEA in the context of a fishery (in which random 
variation in catch is significant) and the assumption of constant returns of scale for the 
technology (an assumption rejected at the 1% level in Weninger and Strand (2003)) may 
limit the scope of the findings.   
Fousekis (2002) used trip-level data for the inshore fleet in Greece corresponding 
to fishing year 2000 to estimate two alternative representations of a multi-output 
technology: the stochastic output distance function and the stochastic ray production 
function. A technical inefficiency model was also specified and estimated simultaneously 
with both the distance function and the ray production function. In this equation, 
technical efficiencies were hypothesized to depend on characteristics of vessel (gross 
registered tons and horse power) and captain (age and level of formal education). The 
empirical results obtained with both specifications were consistent and indicated the same 
technology structure (exhibiting non-separability of inputs and outputs and increasing 
returns to scale) and provided similar relative rankings of efficiency scores. Furthermore, 
both models agreed that the vessel and skipper characteristics considered in the study had 
significant influence on technical efficiency levels. The author used seasonal dummies to 
control for the effects of changes in resource abundance over the year, and dealt with 
zero-harvest trips by replacing the zeros with very small positive numbers.   
Weninger and Waters (2003) studied the northern Gulf of Mexico reef fish 
fishery. Specifically, they used daily data for the year 1993 to estimate the economic 
benefits of replacing controlled access management (which includes vessel entry 
restrictions, per-trip limits and periodic fishery closures) with tradable quotas. Their 




regimes using directional distance functions. The authors concluded that the adoption of 
tradable quotas would create significant benefits for the fishery due to the elimination of 
market gluts caused by seasonal closures and cost savings associated with the removal of 
per-trip catch limits.  
Orea et al. (2005) used daily data to estimate alternative primal stochastic models 
for measuring technical efficiency for the Northern Spain hake fishery in 1999. 
Fishermen in this industry primarily target hake, but they catch a variety of other species 
as well. The authors then compared the resulting efficiency scores from the different 
specifications, that is, from the aggregate-output production function, the distance 
function, and the multi-output production functions (for different base outputs). They 
found that production patterns seemed better represented by multi-output models than by 
an aggregate output production function (i.e. substitutability between outputs was 
significant), but that relative efficiency estimates were not substantially affected by 
model specification. Furthermore, they concluded that the distance function is the most 
appropriate representation of the technology, since it recognizes output substitution, and 
generates efficiency scores invariant to the output selected as the dependent variable.  
Felthoven et al. (2005) studied capacity utilization and technical efficiency among 
catcher-processor vessels operating in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands flatfish 
fishery. They estimated an output distance function using weekly data for the years 1994-
2004 and calculated measures of fleet capacity and vessel-specific capacity utilization. In 
their analysis, the authors allowed for heterogeneous production technology (for the 
different fleet segments), and explicitly used distributional information on technical 




given vessel is the most efficient one in the fleet). In their final specification of the 
distance function, the authors decided not to incorporate information on stocks biomass 
due to problems of collinearity, but included the month in which each fishing trip took 
place in an attempt to capture seasonal variation in the migration of flatfish. 
Pascoe et al. (2007) estimated a stochastic output distance function for two North 
Sea fleet segments (the UK beam trawl and the English otter trawl segments) to derive 
output elasticities of substitution and thus assess the ability of vessels to target different 
species and change harvest composition. Using monthly data for the period 1990-2000, 
the authors not only showed that there exists the potential for limited substitution 
between species, but also that the ability to influence catch composition is not 
homogeneous across the fleet and is linked to the size of the vessel. Larger vessels can 
access a wider range of fishing grounds and can thus take advantage of differences in 
local relative abundance of species. In contrast, smaller boats are less able to modify the 
composition of their catch through their fishing strategy. Interestingly, the authors 
departed from earlier research and explicitly accounted for the stock biomass of each of 
the four species considered. They did so by using partial fishing mortality (i.e. catch over 
stock) instead of catch in their specification of the distance function.   
 
Empirical Research on Cooperation in the Commons 
A substantial experimental literature has focused on the conditions under which 
cooperative behavior is likely to occur among actors providing public goods or extracting 
common-pool resources (see for example, Mason and Phillips (1997), Ostrom (1999), 




empirically investigated the determinants of cooperation in the field when cooperation is 
known to be in place. See for example, Marshall (2004) that studied the propensity to 
cooperate among Australian farmers in the Murray-Darling Basin, or Fujiie et al. (2005), 
which used ordinary least squares to identify key factors for the success of collective 
action among irrigators’ associations in the Philippines. Very few papers, however, have 
attempted to empirically test whether cooperation in the commons exists in the first place.  
Haynie et al. (2009) empirically examined the cooperative behavior of 
commercial fishermen in the Bering Sea. Concretely, they studied the level of provision 
of a public good, bycatch avoidance, in the Alaskan flatfish fishery. This fishery operates 
under a two-tiered total allowable catch (TAC) system, in which TACs are defined over 
target and bycatch species (i.e. pacific halibut, a species of zero value to trawl fishermen 
due to regulations that require it to be discarded). Once either TAC is reached all fishing 
ceases, effectively closing the fishery. Such closures often occur with significant 
remaining quota for the target species. Thus, avoiding bycatch benefits everybody via an 
extended fishing season. Avoidance, however, comes with a large individual opportunity 
cost since the marketable species, yellowtail sole and other flatfish, share similar habitat 
with the bycatch species, making them complements of production. Part of the catcher 
processor fleet contracted with Sea State Inc. in 1995 to begin analyzing government 
observer-collected bycatch information. Sea State provides spatial advisories to the fleet, 
which provide non-mandatory recommendations of areas to avoid in order to reduce 
bycatch. The authors combined catch and bycatch data with information from Sea State 
to estimate a mixed logit model of spatial fishing behavior. In their empirical model, the 




bycatch information signal (i.e. information received from Sea State) and the amount of 
bycatch remaining in the fishery (i.e. before reaching the bycatch TAC) at each point in 
time. The authors found that fishermen predominantly avoided regions with high bycatch 
rates early in the season, but that, as the season progressed, they reduced their degree of 
aversion. This suggested that fishermen were utilizing the bycatch information to enhance 
their performance later in the season, presumably because the target species and halibut 
are complements in production.  
Abbott and Wilen (2010) revisited the Sea State program studied by Haynie et al. 
(2009). The authors used the vessels that initially elected not to participate in the Sea 
State program as a control group to provide the counterfactual of what bycatch levels Sea 
State members would have shown in absence of their participation in the program. To 
this end, they estimated both a reduced form model (using difference-in-differences 
estimation) and a structural model of bycatch avoidance (a variant of a random utility 
model of fishing location choice), which allowed them to use the spatial choices made by 
skippers to uncover their willingness to pay for bycatch avoidance. The findings of both 
approaches proved consistent and indicated that Sea State had no discernible impact on 
bycatch rates in the first three years of its inception, and that from 1998 onwards, bycatch 
rates were higher on average for the initial Sea State participants than for those who 
opted out. The authors attributed the tendency observed after 1998 to the deterioration in 
the incentives for bycatch avoidance among Sea State members. A substantial portion of 
the halibut bycatch TAC is designated for the targeting of yellowfin sole, meaning that 
vessels must retain and process large quantities of yellow sole to utilize this bycatch 




implicit value of holding halibut quota. The authors speculate that non-joiners may have 
had long term contracts for yellowfin sole, effectively isolating them from this price 
decrease. This fact would help to explain the different patterns of bycatch avoidance 
among the fleets after 1998.  
Although not dealing with common pool resources, the study closest in spirit to 
the empirical approach adopted in this dissertation is Battese and Tveteras (2006). In their 
paper the authors studied the salmon aquaculture industry in Norway and found evidence 
of positive effects on technical efficiency associated with agglomeration externalities 
such as knowledge spillovers and shared industry infrastructure. Using panel data they 
estimated a stochastic frontier production function and a technical inefficiency model, in 
which inefficiencies were specified as functions of, among other variables, salmon 
industry size (measured by industry employment) and salmon farm density (farms per 
km2) in the region, and their corresponding square terms (i.e. to capture second-order 
effects). Their results showed a significant (but decreasing) positive effect of industry 
size and farm density on efficiency.  
 
As the articles is this review make clear: i) there is empirical support for the “skipper 
effect” hypothesis, namely, that operators’ skills have a tangible impact on fishing 
performance, ii) harvesting in multispecies fisheries is more properly characterized by a 
multi-output specification of the technology, but controlling for stock biomass variation 
remains challenging; and iii) there has been little empirical research to date testing the 




The empirical approach developed in the remainder of this chapter uses panel data to 
identify early traces of cooperation among the vessels that later joined the Georges Bank 
Cod Hook sector. The model is specified as a system of equations comprised of a 
stochastic distance function in which stocks abundances are explicitly accounted for, and 
an inefficiency equation, in which technical inefficiency depends on vessel 
characteristics, congestion externalities and the degree of cooperation among vessels.  
Furthermore, drawing from the literature linking skipper skills and efficiency, differences 
(across sector joiners and non-joiners) in the effect of unobserved characteristics on 
technical efficiency are interpreted as differences in fishing skill.  
 
 
3.2 Multi-Output Distance Functions and Technical Efficiency 
 
Output distance functions 
When multiple inputs are used to produce multiple outputs, Shephard’s (1970) 
distance functions provide a characterization of the structure of production technology. 
Consider a process that transforms an input vector x , … , xK R
K  into an output 
vector y , … , yM R
M in every time period t t 1, … , T . In the case of a 
commercial fishery, for example, inputs such as crew and bait, among others, are used to 
catch different species (i.e. outputs). Let P  represent the set of all output vectors that 
are feasible for each input vector RK  of period t, i.e. the producible output set. The 




observed output vector  such that the expanded vector is still an element of the original 
output set: 
 




3.2                                    :      
 
Since the output distance function in (3.1) is defined in terms of the producible output set 
, it inherits its properties.  If  satisfies the standard axioms P.1.-P.6 listed 
below, the distance function satisfies the following, equivalent, properties: ,  is 
nonincreasing in  and nondecreasing, homogenous of degree +1, and convex in . 
Furthermore, under these assumptions the output set can be written as: 
: , 1 . The output set is customarily assumed to satisfy the following 
axioms (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000):  
 
P.1 0  
P.2  is bounded for . 
P.3  is a closed set. 
P.4.  for 1   (weak disposability of inputs) 
 
P.5.  for 0,1    (weak disposability of outputs) 





Axiom P.1 states that any nonnegative input vector can produce at least zero output and 
that there is no free lunch. P.2 simply says that finite amounts of inputs can only produce 
finite amounts of outputs.  By axioms P.2 and P.3  is a compact set. Axiom 4, weak 
disposability of inputs, states that if inputs are proportionally increased, outputs do not 
decrease. Weak disposability of outputs, axiom 5, states that a proportional reduction of 
outputs is feasible. P.5 allows for the fact that disposal of some outputs may be costly in 
terms of opportunity cost of forgone output of other commodities.  This is a convenient 
property for modeling production technologies in commercial fisheries where bycatch is 
frequently regulated. Suppose, for example, that output 1 represents catch of a targeted 
species while output 2 is bycatch. Property 5 implies that a b% reduction in bycatch is 
possible if accompanied by a b% decrease in the catch of the targeted species, holding the 
input vector constant (Färe and Primont 1995).  
 
Distance Functions and Technical Efficiency 
An output oriented measure of technical efficiency TE  is defined as: 
 
3.4                                    , :  
 
comparing (3.1) and (3.4), it follows that: 
 





so that TE , 1. This function is illustrated in Figure 3.1 for the simple case of 
two outputs (i.e. species harvested). In the example both vessels A and B operate on the 
interior of P , and the measure of their technical efficiency is given by TE ,
/ φ  1/φ   for i=A,B. Note that one advantage of this efficiency measure is 
that TE ,  is invariant with respect to the units in which x and y are measured 



































3.3 Stochastic Frontiers and the Estimation of Technical Efficiency 
In the single-output case, a production frontier model can be written as: 
 
3.6                                            ;   
 
where  y  is the scalar output of producer i in period t,  is a vector on inputs used by 
producer i in period t, ;  is the production frontier, β is a vector of technology 
parameters to be estimated, and  TE  denotes (output-oriented) technical efficiency on 
producer i in period t. Equation (3.6) can be written as: 
 




which defines technical efficiency as the ratio of observed output to maximum feasible 
output. yit achieves its maximum feasible value of ;  if, and only if,  TE 1. 
Otherwise, TE 1 measures the shortfall of observed output from maximum feasible 
output. In equation (3.6) the production frontier ;  is deterministic and the entire 
shortfall of observed output from maximum feasible output is attributable to technical 
efficiency. To incorporate producer-specific random shocks, equation (3.6) can be 
rewritten as: 
 





where ;  is the stochastic production frontier. Thus, the stochastic 
production frontier comprises a deterministic part ;  common to all producers and 
a producer-specific part exp v , which captures the effects of random shocks in each 
producer. Equation (3.8) can be rewritten as: 
  
3.9                                               
;
 
In (3.9) technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of observed output to maximum 
feasible output in an environment characterized by . As before, y  achieves its 
maximum feasible value of ;  if, and only if, TE 1. 
Defining, 
 
3.10                                                   
 
Equation (3.8) can be rewritten: 
 
3.11                                        ; ,  or 




Since TE 1, it follows that u 0. Thus, in (3.12) u  are viewed as one-sided errors 
representing technical efficiency. In the next section, distributional assumptions are made 
for the two error terms (v  and u ) to allow for the estimation of the parameters using 




that any deviation from the frontier caught by the technical efficiency term, u , is the 
result of factors under the vessel’s control, such as the will and effort of the skipper and 
his crew, and factors such as defective gear. However, the frontier itself can vary 
randomly across vessels due to the random error v . On this specification, the frontier is 
stochastic, with random disturbance v  being the result of favorable and unfavorable 
external events such as luck and climate. Morever, errors of observation and on 
measurement of production also justify the presence of v  on the frontier model (Coelli et 
al. 1999). 
 
3.3.1. Stochastic Distance Functions  
From the definition of the output distance function in (3.1), it follows that for the single 
output case D , y ; y f ;⁄ . Consequently, the multi-output version of 
equation (3.12) is given by (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000): 
 
3.13                                         , ;   
 
This can be rewritten as a stochastic distance function model: 
 
3.14                                       1 , ;   
 
Equation (3.14) can be converted into an estimable regression model by exploiting the 





3.15                                        , ; , ;  
 
Setting  τ 1/yM , the reciprocal of one of the outputs, equation (3.15) can be rewritten 
as: 
3.16                                   / , ;
1
, ;  
 
Substituting D , ;  from (3.16) into (3.14) and taking logs: 
 
3.17                                    / , ;  
 
In what follows it is assumed the vit, the random disturbances accounting for noise, are 
i.i.d. N 0, σ . The objective of the empirical strategy outlined in the next sections is to 
obtain estimates of the stochastic frontier in (3.17), i.e. estimates of β’s and σ , and also 
to obtain estimates of u , which can be used to calculate technical efficiencies TE , and 
to assess how these TE  are influenced by vessel-specific characteristics. 
 
3.4 Model Specification 
In parametric empirical analysis, the standard practice of estimating an output 
distance function is to approximate it via a flexible functional form. Ideally, this would be 
a functional form that can characterize all the economically relevant information, in terms 
of both first and second-order relationships. That is, it can be used to estimate the full 




translog function, which provides a second-degree approximation to the true D ,  in 
(3.1). Thus, using the translog (TL) specification, equation (3.17) can be rewritten as: 
 
3.18                               , , , ,   
 
If regulatory and other shifters wst that may affect the shape of the frontier are included, 
equation (3.18) becomes: 
 
3.19                       , , , ,    
 
 
The inclusion of wst in the specification of (3.19), that is, the inclusion of variables aside 
from the production factors and outputs, assumes that the regulatory environment has a 
direct influence on the production structure. In the context of the highly regulated New 
England commercial fisheries, in which effort controls, seasonal closures and additional 
restrictions very much determine how, where and when vessels fish, this is indubitably 
the case.   
For estimation purposes, the negative sign on equation (3.19) can be ignored. This 
results in the signs of the estimated coefficients for the distance function (i.e. α’s, β’s, δ’s, 
and Ф’s) being reversed, which facilitates interpreting the estimates more comparably to 
standard production function models (as noted in Coelli and Perelman 1996). Thus, for 




negative marginal productivity of inputs), while the first-order coefficients corresponding 
to outputs are expected to be negative (which is consistent with a positive opportunity 
cost of reallocating scarce resources from one output to another, i.e. consistent with a 
downward sloping production possibilities frontier). Equation (3.19) for vessel i in week t 









where y y /yM . Given the interpretation of the translog model as a second-order 
approximation to an arbitrary function, it follows that the symmetry restrictions required 
by Young’s theorem are α α  and β β  for m, n=1,2,…,M-1 and k, 
l=1,2,…,K. In the estimation of equation (3.20), both symmetry and homogeneity of 
degree +1 are imposed.  
To allow for technical efficiency effects, that is, to account for the influence that 
vessel-specific characteristics may have on technical efficiency, the one-sided error in 
(3.20), u , is specified as: 
 





where zit is a Rx1 vector of vessel-specific factors affecting the TE levels, and ηit are i.i.d 
random variables defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance σ , so that at the point of truncation . The latter is consistent with 
u  being a non-negative truncation of the N µ , σ ) distribution, with  
(Fousekis 2002). Letting ∑ , equation (3.21) can be rewritten as: 
 
3.22                                              
 
where the parameter θr indicates the impact of variable zr on technical inefficiency 
deviation from the frontier for vessel i in period t. A negative value of the parameter 
suggests a positive influence on efficiency and vice versa (Coelli and Battese 1993). 
Equations (3.20) and (3.22) are estimated simultaneously using maximum 
likelihood (MLE) and the prediction of fisherman-specific technical efficiencies TE  in 
(3.10) is based on the point estimator proposed by Coelli et al. (1999):24 
 





                                                 
24 TE E exp u |ε exp ζ σ Φ σ /Φ , where Φ(.) denotes the 
distribution function for the standard normal variable, 1 , / , and  
 
1 θ0 ∑ θrzrit
R
r 1 . By replacing the unknown parameters in the equation for TE  
above with the maximum likelihood estimates, the operational predictor for the technical efficiency of the 




3.4.1 Variables used in the Stochastic Frontier 
 
3.4.1.1. The Earlier Years: 1994-2003  
The 386 vessels in the hook gear category harvested more than 40 different 
species during the period of study. The primarily targeted species were cod, which 
comprised 37% of the total pounds harvested (41% of revenues), and haddock, which 
represented 9% of the total (12% of revenues). The remaining 54% of the catch was made 
up of dogfish and small fractions of pollock, white hake, summer flounder, redfish, 
bluefish and black sea bass, among other species. Empirical tractability requires that 
harvested species be aggregated into output groups. Thus, the three outputs included in 
the model are cod, haddock and “other” species.  
A key determinant of catch is the size of the fish stock, and changes in 
composition may represent changes in relative stock abundance rather than changes in the 
behavior of fishermen. In single-output production models, stock abundance is generally 
incorporated directly as an input in the production function. A particular problem exists 
for the use of stock measures in multi-output production models in that each stock 
measure relates directly to only one of the outputs. Further, a composite stock variable 
cannot effectively capture the stock changes of the different species, which do not follow 
a consistent pattern. Note also that since some of the outputs are effectively treated as 
inputs in the estimation process (i.e. on the right hand side of equation (3.20)), a high 
correlation between catch levels and stock size of individual species (as would be 
expected) may lead to problems of multi-collinearity. An alternative is to derive measures 
of partial fishing mortality rather than catch levels per se (Hilborn and Waters 1992, Fox 




each fishing vessel, and are calculated simply by dividing the catch in each time period 
by the stock estimate in that time period. This allows the effects of changes in stock size 
on catch of each species to be incorporated into the analysis, but implicitly imposes 
unitary output elasticity with respect to stock size (Pascoe et al. 2007). This is a 
reasonable assumption provided that the stocks are widely dispersed and fairly uniform in 
density across their areas of distribution (Hilborn and Walters 1992). This is the case for 
cod, haddock and the other species under consideration in the Northeast region. Once 
partial fishing mortalities were computed, the fishing mortalities corresponding to cod 
and haddock were normalized by the partial fishing mortality of “other” species25. This 
latter output was selected since the aggregated catch for the species in this category was 
nonzero for all observations.  
In several trips, the harvested quantities of cod and/or haddock equal zero. To 
allow for logarithmic estimation with a number of zero values of output observations, I 
follow the procedure proposed by Battese (1997), who uses dummy variables associated 
with the incidence of these observations to eliminate bias in estimating a production 
frontier.26 Particularly, I replace output variables (i.e. the normalized partial fishing 
mortalities described in the previous paragraph) y ,   (where m=cod, haddock) with 
y , max y , , D , , where D  are dummy variables. The dummy D  takes a value of 
one if the variable y ,  is equal to zero and a value of zero if the variable is greater than 
                                                 
25 The results are invariant to the choice of the normalizing output (Coelli and Perelman 2000).  
26 Limiting the analysis to the subset of fishing trips with strictly positive outputs for the three output 
groups may be problematic as those trips may not be representative of the whole industry. On the other 
hand, the practice of including the zero-observation cases in the analysis by using the value of an arbitrarily 
small number greater than zero may result in seriously biased estimators of the parameters of the 
production function if the number of zero-cases is a significant proportion of the total number of 
observations (see Battese (1997)). For some concrete applications of this technique, see Tsekouras et al. 





zero. For example, for those trips in which the normalized partial mortality of cod is zero, 
that is y , 0 (i.e. trips for which the log-transformation ln y ,  is undefined), y ,  is 
replaced by a one (so that now ln y , 0), and the dummy variable D  takes the 
value of one, allowing for a different intercept. Thus, in terms of equation (3.20) above, 
Battese’s approach is to specify a slightly different frontier for trips without landings of 
cod. Indeed, the approach (i) assumes the same elasticities for trips that did not catch cod 
as those corresponding to trips that landed cod, (ii) but it allows equation (3.20) to 
accommodate a different intercept for trips without cod. The dummy Dcod captures the 
differential effect on partial mortality of “other species” associated to trips with zero 
landings of cod. Therefore, a statistically significant dummy D  indicates that not 
including it in the model would have introduced bias in the estimation of the parameters 
in (3.20). Identical rationale holds for trips with zero landings of haddock.  
As a result of the transformations described above, the output in the left-hand-side 
of (3.20) corresponds to partial mortality of “other species”, while the outputs in the 
right-hand-side are defined by y , =max{partial mortality cod/partial mortality “other 
species”, D } and y , =max{partial mortality haddock/partial mortality “other 
species”, D }.  
Vessel size, as measured by the hull water displacement (gross registered 
tonnage) was used to represent “fixed inputs”. Crew, defined by the number of workers 
(including the captain) on board the vessel, number of days absent from port, and number 
of hooks, were used as variable inputs in the model, that is, as proxies for the numerous 
inputs that are exhausted within a trip. Both crew size and number of hooks correspond to 




calculated as weekly totals. The number of hooks was included in the specification, as it 
is a key determinant of catch for fixed gear such as bottom longline and handline. 
Various external shift factors (wst in equation (3.20)) likely affect catch in the 
New England Multispecies fishery. One such productivity determinant is the regulatory 
regime. For this fishery, for the period 1994-2003, the primary regulatory changes are 
Amendment 7, implemented in July of 1996, and the Settlement Agreement of August 
2002. Amendment 7 accelerated the DAS reduction called for originally in Amendment 
5, eliminated the exemptions to the DAS program, increased the number and duration of 
area closures, and established rebuilding programs for five overfished stocks. The 
Settlement Agreement was the result of a lawsuit brought against NMFS by 
environmental groups for violating the federal Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 by 
allowing the continued overfishing of cod, haddock, yellowtail flounder and other 
groundfish off the coast of New England. The provisions in the Settlement Agreement 
included a freeze on DAS based on the highest annual level used from fishing years 
1996-2000, reduced by 20%, a freeze on the issuance of new permits, increased gear 
restrictions for certain gear types, including gillnets, hook-gear and trawl nets, 
modifications and additions to the closure areas, and limits on yellowtail flounder catch. 
To facilitate consideration of the resulting productivity effects I include in the w vector 
the dummy variables Damend7 (equal to zero from 1994 to 1995 and one thereafter) and 
Dsettlement (equal to zero from 1994 to 2001 and one thereafter) reflecting these regulatory 
changes. The gear specific dummy variable Dlongline was also included in w to test for the 





3.4.1.2. The Sector Years: 2004-2008 
The stochastic production frontier for years 2004-2008 differs from that described 
in the previous section in two ways: (i) given that biomass data is not available for this 
period, output is specified as catch not as partial fishing mortality, and year dummies are 
added to the vector of shifters w in equation (3.20) in an attempt to control for inter-
annual variation in stocks abundance; (ii) the regulatory dummies Damend7 and Dsettlement 
are dropped from the model. Note that since the econometric specifications are different 
for the periods 1994-2003 and 2004-2008, the models, and hence the estimated technical 
efficiencies, are not comparable across the two periods.  
 
3.4.2 Determinants of Inefficiency 
 
3.4.2.1. The Earlier Years: 1994-2003  
To allow for technical inefficiency effects, the one-sided error uit is specified as a 
function of vessel and fleet characteristics, and sector membership. In particular, the 
inefficiency model can be written as equation (3.24) below: 
 
    
    
 
where D  is a dummy variable whose value depends on the vessel’s type of construction 
(1 if wood, 0 if fiberglass or steel) and attempts to control for vessel’s age (i.e. as newer 
vessels tend to be made of fiberglass or steel), and D  is a dummy that equals one if 




N   represents the number of vessels, out of those that later joined the sector, 
that fished contemporaneously with vessel i in the Georges Bank and Gulf of Maine 
region.  It is calculated as the average (over i’s trips in week t) of the number of (future) 
sector vessels that fished simultaneously with i.  In constructing this variable, vessels are 
considered to fish contemporaneously if there is an overlap on the time span defining 
their trips (i.e. if, for example, vessel j departed at an earlier date and arrived back to port 
at a later date than i’s departure). Similarly, N   represents the average number 
of vessels, excluding those that later became sector boats, that fished contemporaneously 
with vessel i in week t. It includes those vessels –otter trawls, sink gillnets, bottom 
longlines, and handlines– that hold a multispecies permit and hence target the same 
species as vessel i.  
The variables N   and N   attempt to identify any negative 
effects on efficiency that may result from crowding externalities, local depletion and 
information cascades27. As shown in maps 1 and 2 in appendix A, the significant overlap 
in areas fished by fixed and mobile gears in the groundfish fishery suggests at least the 
possibility of congestion externalities in the form of gear conflicts. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that gear conflicts do occur in the Northeast groundfish fishery (Holland 2004).  
A common example of this type of conflict occurs when a towed gear (i.e. trawl) cuts 
across static gear (i.e. gillnet and longlines), resulting in entanglement and loss of nets 
and longlines. Altering the manner (location, speed, course) of deployment of gear to 
avoid direct interactions like gear entanglement adds an additional constraint to fishing 
                                                 
27  “…the efficiency of each boat may be lowered by congestion over fishing grounds” (V. Smith 1968, p. 
413). See also Lynham (2006) for an analysis of information cascades in fisheries, and Larson et al. (1999) 




that could result in reduced catch rates. For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that 
there are negative influences of increasing vessel density on fishing success, beyond 
simple exploitation effects.  
Lastly, the interaction term between future sector membership (D   and the 
number of future sector boats (N  ) seeks to identify any differential effect 
that the presence of these vessels on the water may have on the performance of its peers 
that later joined the sector. If, for vessel i, the presence of additional sector boats 
adversely impacts its efficiency, unless vessel i is itself a future sector peer, then it is 
possible to infer that these vessels may have engaged in some type of cooperative 
behavior (such as information-sharing) before the group formally became a sector under 
Amendment 13.  
Thus, in specification (3.24), the full effect of future sector participation on 
observed vessels’ technical efficiencies u  is captured by the expression    
  . The first term represents, for those vessels that later became 
sector members, the effect of skipper’s and crew’s skills on their boat’s efficiency. In 
other words, this is the effect of future sector participation on technical efficiency when 
the vessel fishes by itself, without its future sector partners. If this first term turns out to 
be positive, it would confirm the assertion that future sector vessels were less efficient 
(i.e. when fishing under identical conditions) than independents. The second term, in 
turn, corresponds to the effects on vessels’ technical efficiencies of sector vessels 
interaction. A negative second term would hint to cooperation and team work among the 
skippers that later became GB Cod Hook sector members. In summary, equation (3.24) 




influences of fishermen skill, vessel characteristics, cooperation among crews, and 
negative externalities such as congestion.  
 
3.4.2.2. The Sector Years: 2004-2008 
The model developed in chapter 2 shows that cooperation and learning within the 
sector are beneficial for its members as they increase the group’s profitability. Increasing 
levels of technical efficiency over 2004-2008 for the GB Hook sector vessels would 
provide some support to the claim that learning to ‘team fish’ is indeed relevant. This 
result, combined with the finding that sector vessels were already cooperating before the 
sector formed (i.e. combined with the expected signs for the coefficients in specification 
(3.24)), would strongly support the relevance of learning for the formation and 
development of sectors. Furthermore, high efficiency scores for sector vessels relative to 
independents would indicate that cooperation pays, that is, it improves individual 
performance. To study the path of technical efficiency in the hook fleet during years 
2004-2008 (i.e. after Amendment 13 was implemented and sectors approved) and to 
compare efficiency scores between sector and common pool vessels, a time-varying 
efficiency model is specified by replacing equation (3.24) with the following expression 
(Battese and Coelli 1992): 
 
3.25                                              
 
where ui are non-negative random variables accounting for technical inefficiency in 
production and are assumed to be i.i.d as truncations at zero of the N µ, σ  distribution, 




inefficiency for that boat (i.e. for t=Ti, uit=ui). If λ>0, then the level of inefficiency decays 
toward the base level. If λ<0, then the level of inefficiency increases to the base level, 




Chapter 4: The Data 
4.1 Description of data 
Data was obtained from the Commercial Fisheries Database System maintained at 
the National Marine Fisheries Service Northeast Fisheries Science Center through 
Agreement #NEFSC-09-001. The primary data source is the logbook information 
required of all vessels with federal limited-entry groundfish permits. Logbooks record 
information on each trip and tow, including species and estimated catch weight, gear 
used, location of fishing, and departure and arrival times.  Supplementary data on vessel 
characteristics was obtained from the Permit Application Database and the Observer 
Database System. 
Trip-level data was aggregated at the weekly level, resulting in an unbalanced 
panel of 25,603 observations corresponding to 386 vessels using hook gear (benthic 
longlines and handlines).28 Only vessels that operated a minimum of three time periods 
were included in the analysis.   
Information on stock abundance –spawning stock biomass– for cod, haddock and 
the other species considered, for the period 1994-2003, came from NMFS’s stock 
assessments and biomass surveys for the Northeast region.29 The stocks of redfish, 
bluefish, dogfish, white hake, pollock and summer flounder were aggregated to compute 
the biomass of “other species”, as they are the main species harvested besides cod and 
haddock and account for 92% of the catch of other species that is broken down by 
                                                 
28 At the weekly level, as over 10% of the 69,000 trips are longer than a day. The results are robust to the 
level of aggregation and remain unchanged when the model is estimated at the monthly or yearly level.  




species, and 70% of the total catch of other species.30 This aggregation procedure 
assumes that optimal input choices and aggregate output levels can be chosen 
independently of the mix of species within this group. Inclusion of additional species in 
this “other species” category was precluded by unavailability of data on their stocks 
biomass. Nevertheless, none of the remaining species (with the exception of skate that 
made up 0.49% of the catch) represented individually more than 0.3% of total harvest.  
Stock information for cod, haddock, white hake and redfish was obtained from the 
“Report of the 3rd Groundfish Assessment Review Meeting” (2007), which details the 
results of the latest stock assessment for the 19 stocks in the groundfish complex. 
Information on pollock came from the report “Status of the Fishery off the Northeastern 
United States” (NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-NE-108, 1995) and was 
complemented with biomass indices in “Report of the 3rd Groundfish Assessment Review 
Meeting”. Data on the summer flounder came from “The Summer Flounder Assessment 
and Biological Reference Point Update for 2006”. Finally, information on dogfish came 
from “The 43rd Northeast Regional Stock Assessment Workshop Summary Report” 
(2006), while data on bluefish was obtained from “The 41st Northeast Regional Stock 
Assessment Workshop (SAW) Assessment Summary Report” (2005). These stock 
assessments use a combination of data from periodical research vessel surveys, observer 
programs, sea-based sampling of discards, and dockside sampling of commercial and 
recreational landings to estimate trends in fish populations. Table 4.1 presents a summary 
with the evolution of stock biomass over 1994-2004 by species. 
 
 
                                                 




Table 4.1: Stock abundance per species (MT) 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bluefish 67,007 67,728 65,644 64,727 70,600 
Cod GB 18,540 18,503 19,697 19,050 19,130 
Cod GOM 10,755 13,566 11,949 9,856 10,814 
Dogfish 460,932 519,920 520,782 489,233 406,287 
Haddock GB 20,406 26,991 36,012 44,106 51,502 
Haddock GOM 1,300 2,157 2,887 4,457 5,952 
Pollock 51,903 79,754 103,490 158,716 122,163 
Redfish 12,015 12,366 17,675 25,225 35,062 
Summer flounder 15,100 18,976 20,067 20,413 22,245 
White hake 22,000 31,133 24,650 18,227 17,734 
 
Table 4.1 (continued): Stock abundance per species (MT) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bluefish 72,900 80,300 87,700 88,200 92,200 
Cod GB 20,744 22,290 25,305 20,078 14,694 
Cod GOM 11,246 14,285 17,848 18,673 16,539 
Dogfish 358,185 343,602 337,686 371,200 293,538 
Haddock GB 60,500 75,111 90,118 104,085 126,003 
Haddock GOM 5,834 6,501 10,517 13,667 11,757 
Pollock 242,426 133,556 387,376 293,538 347,657 
Redfish 46,798 60,380 75,578 92,938 113,478 
Summer flounder 22,551 26,130 33,835 39,051 44,786 
White hake 13,773 25,165 29,023 24,770 16,933 
 
 
Data on the stock status of bluefish, dogfish and summer flounder was 
unavailable for the period 2004-2008. As the purpose of the empirical investigation is to 
test a different set of hypotheses for the pre-sector years than for the years in which the 
GB Cod Hook sector was formally in operation, and considering this limited availability 
of biomass information, two different stochastic frontier models were estimated: (i) for 
seasons 1994-2003 (the pre-sector years), and (ii) for the years following the approval of 




controlled for fish stock variation, was used to test whether vessels that later joined the 
sector were indeed less efficient than the boats that remained independent and to identify 
traces of early cooperation among sector joiners. The second model was used to estimate 
and compare efficiency scores for the sector and the independent fleets.  
Summary statistics describing the data are presented in table 4.2. Homogeneity in 
both vessel characteristics and activity levels (i.e. DAS/week) between the independent 
and the sector fleets is a conspicuous feature of the data. Yet there is considerable 
difference in the quantity of gear (# of hooks and, presumably, bait) utilized by the two 
fleets and, as a result, in their respective average catches per week. In the early years 
1994-2001 all hook fishermen operated under identical regulatory restrictions, and 
variation in the quantity of gear used responds exclusively to skippers’ choices. The 
Settlement Agreement of August 2002 set limits on the maximum number of hooks that a 
vessel could set and haul in the Georges Bank (3,600 hooks) and the Gulf of Maine 
(2,000 hooks) in a trip. This regulation impacted the two fleets differently as over 90% of 
the trips of the sector fleet took place in the Georges Bank, compared with 51% of those 
of the independent fleet. The situation changed again in 2004, when Amendment 13 
confirmed the restrictions established in the Settlement Agreement but exempted GB 












Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the New England groundfish hook gear fleet 
             
Independent Fleet Sector Fleet(a) 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Seasons 1994-2003            
Vessel gross registered tonnage (tons) 15.08 13.39 14.38 7.14 
Crew size(b) 1.84 0.84 1.72 0.56 
Number of hooks(b) 1,010 1,566 2,102 2,074 
DAS/week 1.42 1.68 1.34 1.04 
Cod landings/week  (pounds) 886 2,123 1,999 2,723 
Haddock landings/week  (pounds) 97 427 130 633 
Other species landings/week  (pounds)   1,373 4,561   2,120 7,134 
Number of vessels 325 61 
Type of construction: wood 41 0 
Type of construction: fiberglass or steel 284 61 
Longliners 155 31 
Number of observations 11,898     6,836 
Seasons 2004-2008            
Vessel gross registered tonnage (tons) 13.51 12.58 14.38 7.14 
Crew size(b) 1.85 0.69 1.81 0.88 
Number of hooks(b) 572 1,797 2,806 3,341 
DAS/week 1.16 1.45 1.33 1.01 
Cod landings/week  (pounds) 320 767 647 1,501 
Haddock landings/week  (pounds) 372 1,527 2,513 5,165 
Other species landings/week  (pounds)   758 2,842   760 1,477 
Number of vessels 219 48(c) 
Type of construction: wood 12 0 
Type of construction: fiberglass or steel 207 48 
longliners 89 27 
Number of observations   5,542     1,327   
(a) Throughout the chapter I refer to the vessels that later joined the GB Cod Hook sector as the “sector fleet”. 
(b) Average crew size and number of hooks per week.  






Table 4.2 also highlights a change in the targeting behavior of the fleets during 
the period 2004-2008. From its first season in 2004, sector members made significant 
progress in shifting from overfished stocks (cod) to healthy stocks by participating in the 




allows hook vessels to target haddock in the northwestern corner of the so-called Closed 
Area I in the Georges Bank during a three-month season that runs from October to 
December. Each year the SAP is allocated a haddock TAC which is paired with a hard 
TAC on cod bycatch. The program was initiated in 2004, after an experimental season in 
which hook vessels showed that they were able to target haddock, an underutilized 
resource, while minimizing cod mortality. The program was initially approved as a Hook 
Sector-only CAI Haddock SAP, making it possible for Hook Sector members to access 
the SAP a full fishing year sooner than non-sector hook fishermen. Additionally, non-
sector participants were more likely to have access to the SAP limited by their incidental 
catch cod TAC than sector members, who could apply bycatch toward their entire sector 
allocation of cod. These facts help explain both the change in the composition of the 
catch after 2003, and the increasing difference in catch of haddock between the fleets.31 
As mentioned in chapter 3, two new variables, N   and N  , 
were created and included in the technical inefficiency model for years 1994-2003 to test 
for the presence of crowding externalities and cooperation.  For each vessel, these 
variables were computed using the package MATLAB, conducting a search for all those 
vessels that held a groundfish permit (i.e. that targeted the same species as the hook fleet) 
and fished on the Georges Bank or the Gulf of Maine at the same time as the vessel in 
question. The logbooks include the dates of departure and arrival to port, which 
characterize the time span of each trip. A count was added to the number of “other 
vessels” fishing simultaneously with i, during a specific trip, each time that a non-sector 
                                                 
31 Indeed, haddock revenues were the largest share of groundfish revenues for this sector in every year of 
the period 2004-2008. As stated in the GB Cod Hook sector 2007 Annual Report: “The unavailability of 
GB cod to hook fishermen continues to hamper efforts to harvest the Hook Sector’s GB cod allocation. 





vessel was found on the water between the dates characterizing i’s trip.  The average of 
these numbers over the trips taken by boat i in week t corresponds to N  . The 
variable N   was constructed in similar manner. Table 4.3 presents summary 
statistics for these two variables. 
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of contemporaneous trips 
  Independent Fleet   Sector Fleet 
Variable Mean SD   Mean SD 
Seasons 1994-2003           
N sector vessels 11.5 7.6 13.2 7.1 
N other vessels 334.4 94.7   329.4 66.2 
 
 
From table 4.3 it can be seen that, on average, vessels in both fleets harvested under 
similar conditions of crowdedness. The next chapter shows, however, that the presence of 











Chapter 5:  Results 
 
This chapter discusses the results for the two empirical models specified for the period 
1994-2003 and for the sector years. The empirical findings are widely consistent with the 
predictions of the model developed in chapter 2. Concretely, the results 1) show that the 
least efficient vessels were the first to join the Georges Bank Cod Hook sector in 2004, 2) 
present evidence of earlier cooperation among these vessels (i.e. previous to the 
institutionalization of the group as a sector), hence suggesting familiarity with collective 
harvesting when joining the sector, and 3) demonstrate that technical efficiency was 
higher for sector vessels than common pool boats during the sector years and that it in 
fact increased during this period.  
 
 
5.1 The Earlier Years: 1994-2003 
The system defined by equations (3.20) and (3.24) was estimated by maximum 
likelihood (see appendix B, section I, for the derivation of the log-likelihood function) 
using FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli 1996). Parameters estimates, standard errors, and 
asymptotic t-ratios associated with the final specification for the period 1994-2003 are 
shown in table 5.1. Most of the coefficients were found to be significant at the 1% level. 
Table 5.2 presents Generalized Likelihood Ratio Tests concerning the structure of the 
production technology and the nature of technical inefficiency.  
The model was originally specified as a translog production frontier, but tested for 




specification test in table 5.2 shows that the translog is indeed the preferred functional 
form for the model.  
The estimated coefficients on both right-hand side output variables (cod and 
haddock) are significant and have the expected negative sign for the slope of a production 
possibility frontier. They indicate that substitutability among the outputs is a key 
productive characteristic. The second order coefficients for these variables are also 
negative and statistically different from zero, and the interaction between cod and 
haddock is positive and significant. Overall these estimates indicate that at least some 
inputs are allocable.32 This result is consistent, for example, with the successful 
development of techniques for targeting haddock while minimizing cod bycatch (by 
using herring-based fabricated baits instead of squid), which allowed fishermen using 
hook gear to gain access to the CAI Haddock SAP.  
In addition to the information about output relationships embodied in equation 
(3.20), evaluation of the input-output links may provide some insight into the validity of 
the separability assumption implicit in the aggregate production function models. Input-
output separability can be analyzed by testing the joint significance of the cross-terms 
between input and output variables. As shown in table 5.2, the null hypothesis of input-
output separability is strongly rejected, suggesting that a multi-output model (i.e. distance 
function) is more appropriate than the frequent approach of combining harvest into a 
composite index and then proceeding to estimate an aggregate output production 
function. 
                                                 
32 If inputs are non-allocable (i.e. vessels and their crews harvest several species in a manner that is joint), 
substitution is not possible and an aggregate-output production function completely represents the 




The significance of the estimated first-order coefficients for days at sea, crew size, 
registered tonnage and hooks indicates that extending the duration of a trip, adding new 
crew,  increasing the number of hooks and/or using a larger boat does enhance catch 
quantity.  
The direct impact of the regulatory changes on harvest is represented by the 
significantly negative coefficients for Damend7 and Dsettlement, which is consistent with the 
initial intent of both Amendment 7 and the Settlement Agreement. The coefficient on 
Dlongline, on the other hand, is insignificant, indicating that, after controlling for the 
number of hooks (a main difference between handliners and longliners), the type of gear 
has a negligible effect on catch. Furthermore, the coefficients associated with the zero 
output variables (Dcod and Dhaddock) are statistically significant at the 1% level, which 
confirms that bias would be introduced in the parameters if the output distance function 
was estimated without explicitly addressing the problem of zero values. 
 
Technical Efficiency 
Turning now to the nature of technical efficiency, table 5.2 presents the results of 
two tests of hypotheses. The first null hypothesis is whether or not technical inefficiency 
is absent; i.e., H : σ θ θ θ θ θ θ 0. This null hypothesis is specified 
as: γ θ θ θ θ θ 0, where γ is defined by the reparameterization 
γ σ σ σ⁄ , and lies between 0 and 1. This hypothesis was rejected at the 1% 
level of significance, which confirms that technical inefficiency effects exist in the data. 
The second test (table 5.2, under “Vessel characteristics do not affect TE”) established 




variables (z) under the null hypothesis H : θ 0 for all j’s.  The likelihood ratio test 
indicated that the explanatory variables included in the inefficiency model are jointly 
significant at the 1% level.  
The parameters of the inefficiency equation (3.24) are presented in table 5.1. All 
the coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The positive coefficient for Dtoc indicates that the type of construction is indeed a 
determinant of efficiency. Either wooden vessels are less efficient because of the type of 
construction itself, or alternatively, if in fact this variable works as a proxy for a boats’ 
age, this result confirms the intuition that older vessels tend to underperform those built 
more recently.  Likewise, the positive coefficients for both N   and 
N   suggest that, as more vessels congregate on the fishing grounds, 
fishermen’s interference with each other becomes more severe and, as a result, the mutual 
detrimental effect on individual boats’ efficiencies increases. This finding supports the 
anecdotal evidence mentioned above on crowding and related externalities arising from 
spatial concentration and excessive quantities of fishing gear.  
The significantly positive coefficient for Dsector shows that, as predicted by the 
model in the second chapter, fishermen that later became members of the Georges Bank 
Cod Hook Sector exhibit lower technical efficiency than their independent peers after 
controlling by type of construction and fleet conditions. While this coefficient captures 
the effect on technical efficiency of characteristics that are common to this specific group 
of vessels, to fully account for the impact of future sector participation on efficiency 
during 1994-2003, it is necessary to analyze the interaction term in (3.24). If these vessels 




2004 (acting, for example, as an information-sharing clique or coordinating the search for 
the schools of fish), additional sector boats on the water would most likely have had a 
beneficial effect on team vessels’ efficiencies. The negative coefficient on the interaction 
term in the inefficiency equation confirms this conjecture, and identifies the anticipated 
positive effect on performance. Indeed, as can be readily ascertained from the values of 
the estimated coefficients in table 5.1, the average sector vessel required twelve of its 
peers fishing simultaneously with it in order to achieve the level of efficiency of an 
independent operating under similar conditions. In the data, of the total trips undertaken 
by sector vessels in the period 1994-2003, in 38% of them the number of sector boats 



















Table 5.1: Distance function parameter estimates, 1994-2003 
    Standard   
Parameter Coefficient Error Asymp. t-ratio
α0   ;  Intercept -4.9990 0.0540 -92.66** 
α1    ; ln(cod) -0.4802 0.0067 -71.44** 
α2    ; ln(haddock) -0.2071 0.0054 -38.28** 
α11  ; [ln(cod)]
2 -0.0379 0.0003 -113.6** 
α22  ; [ln(haddock)]
2 -0.0524 0.0003 -154.9** 
α12  ; ln(haddock)*ln(cod) 0.0774 0.0006 130.4** 
δ11  ; ln(cod)*ln(crew) 0.0082 0.0029 2.87** 
δ12  ; ln(cod)*ln(DAS) 0.0087 0.0017 5.22** 
δ13  ; ln(cod)*ln(GRT) 0.0006 0.0017 0.34 
δ14  ; ln(cod)*ln(hooks) 0.0027 0.0005 5.31** 
δ21  ; ln(haddock)*ln(crew) -0.0167 0.0028 -5.93** 
δ22  ; ln(haddock)*ln(DAS) -0.0409 0.0015 -27.70** 
δ23  ; ln(haddock)*ln(GRT) -0.0080 0.0017 -4.81** 
δ24  ; ln(haddock)*ln(hooks) -0.0062 0.0004 -16.96** 
β11  ; [ln(crew)]
2 0.0188 0.0133 1.41 
β12  ; ln(crew)*ln(DAS) 0.0397 0.0094 4.25** 
β13  ; ln(crew)*ln(GRT) 0.0183 0.0098 1.87 
β14  ; ln(crew)*ln(hooks) -0.0022 0.0026 -0.82 
β22  ; [ln(DAS)]
2 0.0433 0.0035 12.46** 
β23  ; ln(DAS)*ln(GRT) -0.0147 0.0054 -2.71** 
β24  ; ln(DAS)*ln(hooks) 0.0174 0.0012 13.91** 
β33  ; [ln(GRT)]
2 -0.0069 0.0040 -1.73 
β34  ; ln(GRT)*ln(hooks) 0.0001 0.0015 0.08 
β44  ; [ln(hooks)]
2 0.0011 0.0006 1.82 
β1  ; ln(crew) 0.0880 0.0349 2.52** 
β2  ; ln(DAS) 0.4328 0.0195 22.24** 
β3  ; ln(GRT) 0.0914 0.0216 4.23** 
β4  ; ln(hooks) 0.0630 0.0069 9.16** 






Table 5.1 (continued): Distance function parameter estimates, 1994-2003 
    Standard   
Parameter Coefficient Error Asymp. t-ratio 
Ф1 ; Dlongline 0.0109 0.0224 0.49 
Ф 2 ; Damend7 -0.0977 0.0085 -11.46** 
Ф 3 ; Dsettlement -0.0405 0.0066 -6.09** 
Ф 4 ; Dcod  1.3313 0.0124 107.2** 
Ф 5 ; Dhaddock  2.1659 0.0160 135.6** 
σ σ σ 3.6412 0.1618 22.51** 
γ σ /σ  0.9909 0.0006 1,786** 
Inefficiency Model       
θ0 ; Intercept -16.7532 0.3765 -44.49** 
θ1 ; Dtoc 3.0125 0.1263 23.85** 
θ2 ; Dsector 2.5254 0.0689 36.66** 
θ3 ; Nother vessels 0.0190 0.0004 46.49** 
θ4 ; Nsector vessels 0.0592 0.0036 16.23** 
θ5 ; Dsector*Nsector vessels -0.2242 0.0076 -29.52** 





Table 5.2: Generalized Likelihood Ratio Tests of hypotheses, 1994-2003 
      Critical   




(1%)   
 Input-output separability: 
 δ11=δ12=δ13=δ14=δ21=δ22=δ23=δ24=0 1,190 8 20.09 Reject H0 
 Cobb-Douglas frontier: 18,829 21 38.93 Reject H0 
Technical inefficiency is absent: 
 γ=θ0=θ1=θ2=θ3=θ4=θ5=0 6,286 7 17.76 Reject H0 
Vessel characteristics do not affect 
TE: 
 θ1=θ2=θ3=θ4=θ5=0 4,235 5 15.09 Reject H0 
Note: As γ takes values between 0 and 1, in H0: γ θ . . . θ 0 the statistic is distributed 




5.2 The Sector Years: 2004-2008 
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and asymptotic t-ratios for the period 2004-
2008 are shown in table 5.3 (see appendix B, section II, for the derivation of the log-
likelihood function). As in the model fitted for the earlier years, most of the coefficients 
were found to be significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, with the exception of a few 
second-order effects and the dummy Dlongline, the coefficients had identical sign as those 
in the distance function estimated for 1994-2003.  
The year dummies, included in the vector of shifters w in (3.20) in order to try to 
control for stock biomass, were significant and negative, likely capturing the detrimental 
effect of lower stocks and adverse climatic conditions on catch over this period. The 
coefficient on Dlongline identified a positive, non-negligible effect on catch of using 
benthic longlines instead of handlines. Lastly, the parameters associated with the zero 
output variables (Dcod and Dhaddock) remained statistically significant.  
Table 5.4 presents Generalized Likelihood Ratio Tests on the structure of the 
production technology and the presence of technical inefficiency. Input-output 
separability is once again strongly rejected and the translog specification preferred over 
the Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
 
Technical Efficiency 
The hypothesis test in table 5.4 (third row, under “Technical inefficiency is 
absent”) confirms that technical inefficiency exists in the data for 2004-2008. This null 
hypothesis is specified as: H : γ λ µ 0 (refer to equation (3.25)) and is rejected at 




implying an upward trend on efficiency for hook fishermen. The rationale behind this 
improvement is twofold: the ability of fishermen to gradually adapt their behavior to the 
newly introduced requirements of Amendment 13 since its implementation in May of 
2004, and the steady flow of vessels that left the fishery during seasons 2004-2008.  
Amendment 13 created categories of DAS, introduced both leasing and a permanent 
transfer programs of DAS, allowed groups of fishermen to form sectors, and introduced 
new input controls. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that after an initial phase of 
adaptation, fishermen became familiar with the new rules and were able to deal more 
effectively with them. On the other hand, only 139 vessels operated in season 2008. The 
vessels that remained active exhibited higher efficiency levels than the boats that exited 
the fishery. 
Table 5.5 shows the yearly average technical efficiencies for the GB Cod Hook 
sector vessels and the independent fleet (i.e. the common pool). Table 5.6 presents the 
same results as table 5.5, but only for those vessels that remained in the fishery over the 
period 2004-2008. Mean efficiencies are considerably higher for sector boats. This fact 
remains true if the comparison is conducted instead only among vessels that remained in 
the fishery over the whole period 2004-2008. These figures imply a beneficial effect of 
sector membership on fishing performance. In fact, as the mean efficiencies for sector 
vessels account for the positive influences of cooperation and team harvesting, they 
suggest that investing in a platform for collective action has a positive return on technical 
efficiency. Furthermore, technical efficiencies increased over the period, hinting to the 
possible impacts of learning within the sector. These facts are consistent with the 





Table 5.5: Yearly average efficiencies for hook fleet, years 2004-2008 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sector vessels 0.692 0.749 0.777 0.784 0.847 




Table 5.6: Yearly average eff. for vessels that remained in the fishery 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sector vessels 0.760 0.767 0.8102 0.833 0.851 
Independent fleet 0.600 0.641 0.676 0.707 0.743 
 
 
This conclusion is tempered, however, by two facts. First, mean technical efficiency also 
improved over 2004-2008 in the independent fleet, suggesting the possibility that the 
improvements observed in table 5.6 for both fleets were, as mentioned above, simply the 
result of the gradual adaptation of fishermen’s behavior to the newly introduced 
Amendment 13. Lacking further information, it is not possible to ascertain what part of 
the improvement in sector vessels’ efficiencies is sector-specific. Second, the theory in 
chapter 2 anticipates entry to the sector as its profitability improves. As table 1.1 in 
chapter 1 shows, there has indeed been entry to the sector, as anticipated, but also exit. 
Recall, however, that in 2004-2008 the GB Cod Hook sector operated under a different 
set of rules than those specified in Amendment 16, the regulatory framework under which 
the results in chapter 2 were derived. Specifically, the GB Hook sector only received 
allocation of cod quota and remained subject to DAS limits and similar effort restrictions. 
Amendment 16 replaced input controls (such as the individual allocation of DAS) with a 




sector membership. These regulatory changes will undoubtedly alter the relative 
attractiveness of common pool and sector membership with respect to that of the period 
2004-2008. Note also that, lacking cost information, it is not licit to make conclusive 
statements on the relative profitability of the two sets of vessels, as technical efficiency is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic efficiency. Undoubtedly, there were 
economically unviable operators in the two groups, as suggested by the fact that vessels 


































Table 5.3: Distance function parameter estimates, 2004-2008 
    Standard   
Parameter Coefficient Error Asymp. t-ratio 
α0   ;  Intercept 4.3554 0.0826 52.74** 
α1    ; ln(cod) -0.1988 0.0146 -13.62** 
α2    ; ln(haddock) -0.7269 0.0168 -43.30** 
α11  ; [ln(cod)]
2 -0.0097 0.0009 -10.85** 
α22  ; [ln(haddock)]
2 -0.0114 0.0010 -11.78** 
α12  ; ln(haddock)*ln(cod) 0.0128 0.0017 7.42** 
δ11  ; ln(cod)*ln(crew) -0.0188 0.0083 -2.28* 
δ12  ; ln(cod)*ln(DAS) -0.0110 0.0041 -2.69** 
δ13  ; ln(cod)*ln(GRT) -0.0012 0.0042 -0.27 
δ14  ; ln(cod)*ln(hooks) -0.0293 0.0015 -19.24** 
δ21  ; ln(haddock)*ln(crew) 0.0292 0.0101 2.89** 
δ22  ; ln(haddock)*ln(DAS) 0.0340 0.0050 6.75** 
δ23  ; ln(haddock)*ln(GRT) 0.0011 0.0053 0.20 
δ24  ; ln(haddock)*ln(hooks) 0.0372 0.0018   20.67** 
β11  ; [ln(crew)]
2 -0.0165 0.0449 -0.37 
β12  ; ln(crew)*ln(DAS) 0.0225 0.0258 0.87 
β13  ; ln(crew)*ln(GRT) 0.0629 0.0353 1.78 
β14  ; ln(crew)*ln(hooks) 0.0060 0.0104 0.58 
β22  ; [ln(DAS)]
2 0.0341 0.0099 3.45** 
β23  ; ln(DAS)*ln(GRT) -0.0430 0.0139 -3.09** 
β24  ; ln(DAS)*ln(hooks) 0.0911 0.0046 19.90** 
β33  ; [ln(GRT)]
2 -0.0231 0.0207 -1.12 
β34  ; ln(GRT)*ln(hooks) 0.0036 0.0071 0.51 
β44  ; [ln(hooks)]
2 -0.0061 0.0021 -2.92** 
β1  ; ln(crew) 0.0280 0.1011 0.28 
β2  ; ln(DAS) 0.3720 0.0376 9.88** 
β3  ; ln(GRT) 0.0953 0.0721 1.32 
β4  ; ln(hooks) 0.1571 0.0225 6.98** 







Table 5.3 (continued): Distance function parameter estimates, 2004-2008 
    Standard   
Parameter Coefficient Error 
Asymp. t-
ratio 
Ф1 ; Dlongline 0.7101 0.0664 10.69** 
Ф2 ; D2005 -0.0623 0.0201 -3.10** 
Ф3 ; D2006 -0.0755 0.0240 -3.15** 
Ф4 ; D2007 -0.2249 0.0277 -8.13** 
Ф5 ; D2008 -0.1909 0.0335 -5.69** 
Ф6 ; Dcod -1.2952 0.0494 -26.21** 
Ф7 ; Dhaddock -2.0718 0.0437 -47.39** 
σ σ σ  1.2798 0.1707 7.50** 
γ σ /σ  0.7985 0.0298 26.77** 
μ -2.0218 0.3854 -5.25** 
λ 0.0017 0.0003 5.64** 




Table 5.4: Generalized Likelihood Ratio Tests of hypotheses, 2004-2008 
      Critical   




(1%)   
 Input-output separability: 
 δ11=δ12=δ13=δ14=δ21=δ22=δ23=δ24=0 797 8 20.09 Reject H0 
 Cobb-Douglas frontier: 3,024 21 38.93 Reject H0 
 Technical inefficiency is absent: 
 γ=λ=μ=0 1,551 3 7.05 Reject H0 
 Note: As γ takes values between 0 and 1, in H0: γ λ µ 0 the statistic is distributed 






5.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has attempted to test the main predictions of the theoretical model 
introduced in the second chapter on the formation of voluntary harvesting cooperatives in 
commercial fisheries. Building on earlier research that establishes links between technical 
efficiency and fishing skill (Kirkley et al. 1998, Viswanathan et al. 2002, Hoff and Frost 
2005), the analysis uses technical efficiency to study the formation of the Georges Bank 
Cod Hook Sector, the first sector to start operations in the New England groundfish 
fishery. The approach has been to estimate a system of equations defining a stochastic 
output distance function with technical inefficiency effects (Battese and Coelli 1992, 
1995) using maximum likelihood estimation. The empirical results confirm that indeed 
the least efficient vessels later became Hook Sector members and that this subset of 
vessels seemed to have engaged in some kind of cooperative behavior prior to the 
constitution of GB Cod Hook sector in 2004. In fact, the results suggest that the 
coordination of the harvesting may have helped these vessels to overcome their lower 
skill level. This was certainly the case for the seasons 2004-2008 when the GB Hook 
sector was officially in operation, as is clear from the estimated efficiency scores for that 
period. These findings are consistent with the claims that 1) familiarity with team fishing 
increases the likelihood of sector adoption by fishermen, since it lessens the uncertainty 
on the profitability of the collective operation, and that 2) returns from cooperation 




A limitation of the approach adopted in this study is that it has relied exclusively 
on the analysis of technical efficiency. The unavailability of cost data has precluded the 
estimation of profit or cost frontiers. Economic efficiency, however, has technical and 
allocative components. While the technical component refers to the ability to avoid waste 
by producing as much output as technology and inputs allow, the allocative component is 
equally important as it refers to the ability to combine inputs and outputs in optimal 
proportions in light of prevailing prices. Thus, while the findings of this chapter seem to 
support the predictions presented in the theoretical model introduced in the previous 




Chapter 6:  Conclusion  
 
The adoption of market-based rationalization programs in commercial fisheries 
has been met by a great deal of success in countries like Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand.  Drawing on these previous experiences, the U.S. National Marine Fisheries 
Service has endorsed in 2010 the adoption of rights-based systems by releasing a “NOAA 
Catch Share Policy”, in which it encourages regional councils to consider the use 
individual or collective harvesting quotas.  Rights-based systems give fishermen a stake 
in the health of the fishery, often reducing the adversarial nature of fisheries regulation 
and management and creating stewardship incentives among participants. The allocation 
of quota shares to harvest cooperatives, in particular, has recently generated considerable 
interest among fishermen and regulators. Many consider the promotion of self-
governance by increasing the scope of decisions assumed by the industry to be essential 
to achieving more sustainable, equitable and efficient management. 
Successful case studies of self-governance in fisheries have been extensively 
documented and the efficiency gains associated with cooperative harvesting are well 
established. Nevertheless, self-governance has emerged in relatively few of the world’s 
fisheries. Research on the obstacles to the adoption of self-regulation has traditionally 
focused on the number and heterogeneity of harvesters and the difficulties of enforcement 
and free-riding. Yet it is doubtful that these obstacles exhaust all the conditions under 
which fishermen’s attempts to self-organize break down. Furthermore, once fishermen do 
decide to join harvesting cooperatives they face strong incentives to actively engage in 




Cooperation can boost profitability and is typically achieved through the design of fishing 
rules that attempt to coordinate the activities of coop members. Anecdotal evidence 
shows these fishing rules do not remain unchanged but evolve through time, allowing 
groups to progressively broaden the scope of their cooperation. Thus, the accumulation of 
experience in team fishing as permit holders work together seems to be a critical trigger 
in the development of more complex collective fishing schemes. 
This dissertation adopts a different perspective from the earlier literature by 
examining how incomplete information on the optimal implementation of collective 
fishing: i) affects the incentives to undertake cooperation, and ii) determines the likely 
path of coordination of activities within the group when cooperation emerges. I begin by 
developing a theoretical model of the fishery in which fishers have limited previous 
experience with team fishing, but learn-by-doing. Each season fishermen must decide 
whether to harvest competitively in the common pool, or instead join a cooperative group 
(a sector) and choose the number of tasks to coordinate based on fishermen’s current 
information on collective fishing. Only upon joining the sector do harvesters receive as 
allocation a share of the total allowable catch (TAC).  In the dissertation I study the 
equilibria of the sector-formation game played by the heterogeneous fishermen, to answer 
the following questions concerning fishing cooperatives: Under what conditions are 
harvesting cooperatives or sectors expected to form? Who will join? What types of 
harvesting schemes will emerge? 
The model predicts that a lack of familiarity of fishermen with cooperative 
harvesting may entirely preclude cooperatives from forming. On the other hand, if sectors 




the scope of their cooperation (i.e. the number of coordinated tasks) is expected to 
increase gradually over time. The model also shows that sector members have incentives 
to consolidate their fleet when there is overcapacity (i.e. excess capacity to catch the 
sector’s quota) and extend the duration of the season. These results are consistent with a 
variety of stylized facts about fishing coops. They help explain, for example, the increase 
in season length associated with the formation of cooperatives such as the Chignik 
Cooperative and the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative, and why it is rather 
infrequent to see quota holders pooling their shares of the TAC and fishing cooperatively 
despite the potential efficiency gains. Furthermore, the rationale offered in the model –
incomplete information on how to organize collective fishing– is essentially different 
from the familiar free-riding in teams, or from adverse selection arguments that rely on 
asymmetric information on permit holders’ skills. 
The empirical component of this dissertation examines the predictions of the 
theoretical model using information on the fishermen that in 2004 voluntarily joined the 
first sector to start operations in the New England Multispecies Fishery, the Georges 
Bank Cod Hook sector. Concretely, the empirical section studies whether these fishermen 
were less skilled than those that chose to remain independent, whether they had actively 
engaged in cooperation (i.e. hence, acquiring familiarity with team fishing) before the 
sector was formally constituted, and if learning occur during the sector operation years. 
Lacking cost information on the fishery, I build on the existing literature linking 
harvesting skill and technical efficiency and conduct the analysis using a primal 
approach.  Concretely, I estimate a stochastic output distance function and a technical 




equations allows the characterization of the underlying multi-output technology and the 
assessment of the impact of vessel characteristics and fleet conditions (i.e. such as 
crowding of fishing grounds and cooperative interactions) on vessels’ technical 
efficiencies. Unlike most empirical studies of fisheries production frontiers, which 
implicitly assume input-output separability and estimate a weighted aggregate measure of 
output as function of inputs, this dissertation uses a multi-output approach, allowing for 
the testing of the separability assumption and the derivation of the ability of fishermen to 
alter their output mix. Second, the analysis is applied to panel data, and unlike short-term 
studies, it explicitly incorporates the variability of stocks biomasses over time into the 
estimation. Third, the study explicitly accounts for the effect of fishermen’s interactions 
on efficiency in order to identify cooperation among harvesters. The results show that 
indeed the least efficient vessels were the first to join the Georges Bank Cod Hook sector 
in 2004, present evidence of earlier cooperation among these fishermen and demonstrate 
that technical efficiency was higher for sector vessels than common pool boats during the 
sector years and increased during this period.  
The success of harvesting cooperatives or sectors is likely to rest partly on the 
strength of the relationships among fishermen, including their degree of trust and 
collaboration. It is reasonable to think that successful sectors will build norms and 
networks that enable collective action and learning over time. The analysis in this 
dissertation highlights the role of human capital, conceived here as fishermen’s stock of 
shared-experience with collective harvesting, in the formation of cooperatives. This 
research shows that the regulator should explicitly address questions concerning the type 




the learning process regarding this new way of fishing and thus boost the adoption of 
collective arrangements of self-governance. 
Building capacity among fishermen to organize and administer sectors will likely 
entail empowering existing platforms for collective action such as fishermen’s 
associations, documenting previous experiences to encourage learning from successes in 
other fisheries, and coaching and guidance on business planning and management. Not 
surprisingly, thirteen of the nineteen recently approved sector plans were submitted by 
the same institution, the Northeast Seafood Coalition, a membership organization that 
represents fishermen interests. This dissertation shows that, from a policy standpoint, 
building capacity among harvesters is an essential and irreplaceable complement to the 
assignment of property rights when the end objective is to promote self-governance. 
Furthermore, this research demonstrates that management agencies should not expect the 
efficiency gains stemming from fishermen’s cooperation to be realized immediately but 
rather gradually over time if harvesters must first learn to coordinate their activities. The 
regulator should pay attention to these matters, as it could have serious policy 
implications in terms of reducing the long-term economic and environmental costs of the 
transition to catch shares.  
There are a number of potential extensions of this dissertation research.  In the 
current analysis, many of the problems of the internal governance structure of the 
cooperative (such as free-riding, bargaining and moral hazard) are assumed away. In the 
theory section the sector manager is modeled as implementing all of the decisions for the 
group, and hence frictions within the team activity are absent. Future work should 




dissertation, the regulator is in the “background” and its only role is to set the TAC each 
season. Hence, problems of monitoring of landings and enforcement of quotas are ruled 
out. However, if compliance requires costly enforcement, it is worthwhile exploring 
under what conditions the regulator is better off dealing with fewer players (i.e. sectors) 
that have incentives to police each other, rather than with individual fishermen. Further, 
how do the incentives to join the sector change when overages of the common TAC 
undermine the sectors’ allocations the following period? Further research should 
investigate these and similar questions. Ultimately, the successful implementation of 
catch shares, with their intended benefits in terms of higher industry profits and 
















APPENDIX A: Spatial Distribution of Trips by Gear 
 
 















APPENDIX B: Derivation of Log-Likelihood Functions 
 
I. The earlier years: 1994-200333 
For simplicity of exposition and in order to avoid cumbersome notation, I rewrite the 
inefficiency stochastic frontier model defined by equations (3.20) and (3.24) as: 
 
A. B. 1                                                       
A. B. 2                                                      
 
where  , i=1,2,3,…,N, and t=1,2,3,…,T. It is assumed that the  are i.i.d 
N 0,  random variables, independent of the ’s, which are assumed non-negative 
truncations of the N ,  distribution. 
Thus, equation (3.20) is rewritten as equation (A.B.1), where  represents, in fact, the 
logarithm of “other species” partial mortality for the ith vessel in the tth time period, and 
 and  denote, respectively, the vectors of independent variables and parameters in 
(3.20).  
The density function for  is given by: 
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The truncated normal density function for  is given by: 
 
                                                 




A. B. 4                     
1
√2  Φ /
·
2
 ,   0 
 
where  is the mean of the normal distribution, which is truncated below at zero, and 
Φ ·  the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Thus  is the density 
function of a normally distributed variable with nonzero mean , truncated below at 
zero. Given the independence assumption, the joint density function of  and  is 
simply the product of their individual density functions, and so: 
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Since from (A.B.2)   , the joint density function of  and  is: 
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which, upon defining ⁄   and ⁄ , 
can be rewritten as: 
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The marginal density of  is obtained by integrating  out of , , : 
A. B. 8                                                      , ,  
which yields (A.B.9): 
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which can be rewritten as: 
A. B. 11    
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where  / . 
 
If there are Ti observations for the i
th vessel, and denoting , , … ,  the 
vector of the Ti partial fishing mortalities in equation (A.B.1), then the logarithm of the 
likelihood function for the whole sample, , , … , , is given by: 
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where , , ,  is the vector of parameters to estimate.  
 
Finally, using the reparameterization suggested by Battese and Corra (1977), / , 
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where / / , 1  / 1 /  , and 
, , ,  is the vector of model parameters to estimate.  
 
II. The sector years: 2004-200834 
As in the previous section, rewrite the system of equations (3.20) and (3.25) as: 
 
A. B. 15                                             
A. B. 16                                                
 
where  and  . It is assumed that the  are i.i.d 
N 0,  random variables, independent of the ’s, which are assumed non-negative 
truncations of the N ,  distribution 
 
The density function for  is: 
                                                 




A. B. 17                       
1
√2  1  Φ /
·
2
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where, as before,  Φ ·  represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
Using the independence assumption between  and , write their joint density function 
as: 
A. B. 18            , ,
1





Since   , the joint density function of  and  is given by: 
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Defining ⁄  and ⁄ , the 
joint density function in (A2.19) can be rewritten as: 
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1
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The density function for  is obtained by integrating , ,  with respect to the 
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Denoting by  the (T x1) vector of the ’s (with ) associated with the 
T  observations for the ith vessel, the density function for  can be written as (A.B.23) 
below: 
   
1 Φ /





where ⁄   and ⁄ . 
 
The density function for , the (T x1) random vector of ’s for the ith vessel, is 
obtained from (A.B.23) by substituting   for , where  is the (T xk  matrix of 
’s for the ith vessel, where k is the dimension of the vector of parameters . The log-
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where , , , ,  is the vector of model parameters to estimate.  
 
Finally, using the reparameterization suggested by Battese and Corra (1977), / , 
with  , the log likelihood function in (A.B.20) can be rewritten as: 
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Summary of the Variables in the Theoretical Model of Chapter 2: 
 
Variable  Description 
  Fish biomass in t 
  Unit cost of effort of fisherman i 
  Implementation of fishing scheme ω in season t  
  Catch of individual fisherman i in season t 
  Catching skill of fisherman i 
  Summation of skill over all permit holders in the fishery 
N Number of permit holders in the fishery 
p Catch price 
  Random disturbance in t 
  Variance of  
PSC   Fisherman i’s quota in t 
  Sector’s quota in t 
  Common pool’s quota in t 
  Member i’s share of sector profits 
Ω  Set of collective fishing schemes 
ω  Number of tasks to coordinate under fishing scheme ω Ω 
ω  max ω| ω Ω  
  Target parameter for fishing scheme ω 
  Unit cost of effort reduction per input used under perfect implementation of ω 
TAC   Total allowable catch for season t 
  Fishing time for fisherman i in season t 
 Time the stock is available each season 
  Public good input provision in t 
  Beliefs on  in season t  
  Variance of beliefs  
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